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The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly

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Column Right! March!

WARD M. MORTON

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Military training has always been tinctured with a considerable degree of conservative indoctrination.¹ Warfare, on the other hand, is not necessarily conservative. The list of social reforms, new inventions and adaptations resulting from wars and "Old Regimes" up-set as a result of war is very long. Only a hasty glance at history is necessary to illustrate this fact.

The nature of modern war makes this paradox of unprecedented importance at the present time. A great deal of the support for compulsory military training in all countries comes from those who approve its primarily conservative nature. These people emphasize the disciplinary and repressive aspects of military training. The conditioning of youth in unquestioning obedience, the inculcation of sentiments of rank and ceremonial precedence and the notion that insubordination is *the* unforgivable sin, all these factors are regarded as salutary in the training of modern youth.

This training is regarded as salutary because it induces a state of reverence for prescriptive authority and a habit of submissive acceptance of the unequal distribution of the perquisites and privileges of rank and command. The more the productivity of a machine civilization increases, the more the conservative elements of society must depend upon intensifying training of the masses in the disregard for creature comforts and the sanctification of heroic virtues for the preservation of a conservative order. From the conservative point of view military training easily comes to be regarded as a sort of final barricade against a more equitable distribution of the products of the machine age.² In peace-time this conservative aspect can safely be permitted to consume a major portion of the time devoted to military training.

¹Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, 391-398.

²Peter Drucker, *The End of Economic Man*, 137 et seq.

Few military situations have been so pressing that dominant military groups have not felt justified in devoting a considerable portion of military training to intensive conditioning of the recruits in a conservative order of life. A thorough indoctrination in the semi-tribal existence of the "military way of life" has been considered necessary before the "rank and file" could be entrusted with weapons or trained in the use of these weapons. The harsh necessities of war, however, have at times imposed upon the military a considerable reduction in the time devoted to the conservative or peace-time aspects of military training.³

There is much evidence to indicate that the folk-ways of the military require considerable modification in actual combat. The mobility of modern war requires relaxation of the rules of deference and ceremony due to rank and the costumes and insignia of rank. The universally accepted tactic of modern war of concentrating on the capture and destruction of ranking officers has necessitated the proliferation of subterfuges to conceal the presence of rank and command. Special salutes, special costumes and insignia have had to be abandoned and still further innovations devised to protect officer personnel by concealment.

The diffusion of authority, information and training for command on a wide scale among the general soldiery has also been made necessary by modern war. Otherwise the struggle could not be continued when commanders are killed or captured or the rapid flexibility of the situation separates commanders and commanded. The very technical nature of modern war makes diffusion of technical knowledge and competence necessary. The more technical warfare becomes the more the old theories of rank and command become an impediment, not an aid, in the conduct of war.

This type of in-combat training, forced upon the reluctant military, lessens the rigid compulsions of non-combat military training. To some extent it requires a de-training and re-training before personnel can be satisfactorily adjusted to the necessities of the combat situation. It is painfully clear that the adaptability, the power of improvisation and the quick adjustment to new circumstances—spoken of by all military commentators as the great strength of the American soldier—was not the product of non-combat military training. It was either the product of his civilian environment or else was learned in actual combat.⁴

³"The Peacetime Army: Warriors Need Not Apply", by Eric Larrabee, *Harper's Magazine*, March, 1947, 242; "Close-Up of Democracy", by Carl Dreher, *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Winter, 1947, 104-105.

⁴"Too many civilians came into the Army who cared more about getting things

The strict discipline imposed upon combat troops, when not in actual combat, indicates a recognition on the part of the military of the need for rigid re-indoctrination in conservative virtues. This applies especially to dress, ceremonial and limitations on freedom of movement. Without this re-training the conservative animus carefully inculcated into the troops would be completely destroyed by the rigors of combat.

Those who have never experienced basic military training can talk glibly about one year of compulsory training providing an army of four million men prepared instantly to defend their country against attacks by rocket projectiles and atomic weapons. As the military services of the United States were organized in the recent war, one year of peace-time training would hardly be sufficient to initiate the novices in the esoteric mysteries of the salute, the minute intricacies of Close Order Drill and the endless variations of inspections.⁵ Ceremonials, guard mounts and just standing in line and waiting for some required activity also rank high as time consumers. The concentration of all powers of decision in the hands of a few key officers still further exaggerates this process so that spending a week securing authorization to do an hour's work is almost standard operational procedure.

Military philosophy is conservative also, especially as regards human relationships.⁶ Strictly speaking military organizations cannot be said to have a philosophy. They have only a collection of pragmatic and uncoordinated justifications of immediate situations faced by various commanders at various times. These are diverse, with many contradictions and do not approach anything like a consistent explanation of events social, political, moral or even military.

A few illustrations should suffice to indicate this conservative

done than they cared about getting them done right. In their haste to get on with the war they discovered that most of the traditional 'made-work' didn't really *have* to be done; all that was needed was an officer's signature on the statement that it had been done last week. This worked out two ways. Among the results must be counted graft, embezzlement, black-marketing—yet also most of the speed and energy with which we fought the war. Regular army officers generally looked the other way while this efficiency was being hatched; it was inspired short-cutting, but the cool dishonesty of it must have given them the horrors."

"The Peacetime Army..." by Eric Larrabee, 244.

⁵It should be remembered that France also had compulsory military training at the outbreak of World War II, but the complex mazes of French close order drill proved no match for German tanks and air planes.

⁶"Close-up of Democracy", by Carl Dreher, 101.

point of view. Women are relegated to subordinate positions. Mistresses are encouraged and wives and families discouraged. Post commanders are expected to rule like feudal barons.⁷ In the American Army this extends even to making them responsible for declaring the seasons of the year and prescribing the appropriate costumes with or without regard for actual weather conditions. Surface formalities are always preferred to substance, ceremonial and "spit and polish" to useful or realistic activities. Conditioning the public to the acceptance of military censorship appears at least equally as important to the military as denying information to the enemy.⁸ The question of right or wrong never arises. The only question is "is it possible to get by with it?" Neither does the truth or untruth of any supposed fact come into consideration. The only consideration is whether or not some commanding officer has made a pronouncement on this subject.⁹ Technological, scientific or scholarly *expertise* is regarded as largely a civilian myth. A few hours with a military manual—or in extreme cases an accelerated short course—should suffice to make any one an expert on any subject.¹⁰

The conflict between a conservative point of view and the necessities of modern war reaches its peak at that point where the dependence of the military upon science is greatest. This is particularly true of the new scientific weapons, the most dramatic of which is atomic energy. Atomic energy is a new source of power. The discovery of every new source of power has laid the foundation for the creation of a new aristocracy. This new aristocracy has always tried to keep the operating process of its new invention a secret. Every school child is familiar with the efforts of English manufacturers to keep the secret of the steam engine. All efforts to maintain monopolistic control of new inventions have always eventually failed and the inventions have had to be shared with other groups. In the meantime the newly created aristocracy has thrived. What is new about atomic energy as a source of power is its tremendously destructive nature. Because of this fact the military organizations of the world must inevitably be embroiled in the very center of the controversy over who shall control this power

⁷"American Military Government Organization in Germany", by Harold Zink, *The Journal of Politics*, Aug., 1946, 344-345.

⁸"How the Censors Rigged the News" by Fletcher Pratt, *Harper's Magazine*, Feb., 1946.

⁹"Samples of the Army Mind", by J. Frank Dobie, *Harper's Magazine*, Dec., 1946, 535.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 529-536 *passim*.

and must in fact strive—particularly the officer class—for the position of this new aristocracy.¹¹

Thus it is that the military organizations of all countries become the focal point of the current controversy in any country between progressive and conservative forces. In order to conduct an adequate mass training program in the techniques and requirements of future scientific warfare a revolution is required in the concepts and training methods of all contemporary military organizations—a revolution which only a small group within the military shows any tendency to recognize or accept.¹² The more technical and scientific warfare becomes the more thoughtful persons are led to question the need for mass armies in terms of current standards of military training. The more questionable the need for conventional mass armies the more large military organizations must seek a justification for their existence. The plea that the military organization is a nucleus around which a program of universal military training must be built offers the most fruitful appeal in all countries for the continued existence of large military organizations. The more science and technical improvement increase the potential productivity of industry and agriculture the more conservative elements in all societies must seek some means and justification for the preservation of a conservative social order. Again, universal military training, tinctured with a considerable degree of conservative indoctrination, offers the most hopeful means. The continued threat of war offers the most hopeful justification.

It is precisely at this point that the dilemma of military training in the "Atomic Age" appears. If one of the important purposes of the training is the inculcation of a conservative animus in the troops and among the population, then real military preparedness for combat must be neglected to that extent. Stated bluntly this means that to the extent military organizations in any country assume ceremonial and sentimental functions then to that extent they must neglect military functions. It is equally clear that unless these ceremonial correctives for the spirit of equalitarianism (in this country currently called "radicalism" and in Russia possibly called "bourgeois-ism") are applied on a wide scale they will be in-

¹¹U. S. Congress. A Bill for the Development and Control of Atomic Energy (The May Bill) 79th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 4566. Particularly Sec. 2, (d); Sec. 4, (b); Sec. 5; Sec. 10; Sec. 13, (d); Sec. 16 and Sec. 18.

¹²"Umtees"—First Soldiers of the 'New Army', by Gilbert P. Bailey, *New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 23, 1947. Using slightly less harsh and undemocratic methods—while commendable—for training recruits in the same old Army tasks and habits of mind is not necessarily training either a modern army or a democratic army. "Close-Up of Democracy", by Carl Dreher, 98.

effective. Hence the appeal for universal compulsory military training.

At one moment the horrors of war, combined with sabotage on a colossal scale, in the age of rocket propulsion, guided missiles and atomic explosives, are emphasized. The unpreparedness of the particular country where the appeal is being made to meet this kind of onslaught is pictured and the public urged to appropriate more money for intelligence services, scientific study and the development and perfection of new and more horrible weapons. At the next moment the need for mass armies is insisted upon as one of the requisites for military preparedness. The public is asked to believe that the training of all youths in close order drill, manual of arms, inspections, parades and police and fatigue details will prepare the country to defend itself against the type of attack pictured above. Apparently what the military organizations have in mind is a small inner military aristocracy composed of scientists and military people which will devise the real weapons of war and determine the policies for their use. The mass military training is to assure the passivity of the public while this is taking place and to provide a group of well-trained military policemen for occupation duty once the military and industrial ruin of a possible rival is achieved by the use of scientific weapons.

It should be pointed out also that military organizations are mutually necessary to each other. Appeals to patriotism, martial sentiment and alleged threats to national safety would fall very flat without the presence of reputedly hostile military organizations in other countries. Choice of the particular country whose military organization is selected to furnish the emotional symbol of "the enemy" will depend in any country on which possible enemy name has the most emotional content at the moment. There is little doubt for example that countries other than Russia have at this moment spies in this country trying to discover our military secrets. The arrest and prosecution of agents of Argentina or Spain, however, gives no emotional impetus to conservative policy and therefore such events do not reach the pages of the press. If the stories told by scientists and military men about the weapons of the future are correct then even small countries like Sweden, Argentina, Spain or Switzerland may hope to become world powers if they can discover and apply the secrets of atomic energy and jet and rocket propulsion. They cannot, however, raise mass armies and therefore are of little value and seldom mentioned in the current war of symbols in the controversy over military training.¹³

¹³"Close-Up of Democracy", by Carl Dreher, 107.

The final dilemma of continual military training of a ceremonial and conservative nature also cannot be overlooked. It tends to perpetuate the actual imminence of war. The more realistic military training is in an era of scientific destruction the more obvious become the advantages of peace. Also the techniques for the realistic control of science in war sufficiently parallel the necessary techniques for the application of science to the problems of peace that a large carryover of training would result.¹⁴ On the other hand the more nationalistic and conservative the training the more martial sentiment it arouses and therefore the more it invites war. The more war is invited by conservative policy the more the military organization and therefore the country is unprepared for war. Thus is set in motion the paradox of modern nationalistic military policy: the more conservative the nature of the military organization the more it must secretly fear war but the more it must publicly risk war and thus run the danger of actually starting one. Moreover because of the nature of scientific weapons the urge to attack first is increased in proportion to the general unreadiness of the military to sustain a prolonged and realistic scientific war. The continual threat of war thus becomes a primary factor in the domestic policy of any ruling group which seeks to perpetuate itself in the face of popular pressure.

Any military organization in the world today which does not face-up realistically to the future world of scientific marvels appears to be well on the road to becoming a glorified domestic police force. For conservative military organizations the political capture and control of the capital city of the home country easily becomes an imperative. The path toward nationalistic conservatism and a domestic military aristocracy is not the path to military competence in the modern world. It should be clear that an army designed solely to support a Talmadge in Georgia, a Peron in Argentina, or a Franco in Spain against domestic opposition would be completely useless in a full-scale modern scientific war. In fact the more closely one is associated with the peace-time military service the more it is impossible to avoid wondering whether the new and bigger "Pearl Harbors" so freely predicted by our military leaders might not catch the military even more colossally unprepared than before without much regard to any one-year program of peace-time training which our military institutions are at present prepared to provide.

¹⁴"The Peacetime Army", by Eric Larabee, 246.

The Outlook for Population Increase in Texas*

HENRY S. SHRYOCK, JR., and JACOB S. SIEGEL

Bureau of the Census

There is a frequent tendency on the part of other social scientists to expect the demographer to be able to furnish them with an estimate of the future size of a population so that they in turn may forecast the change in other social data. For example, they may want the population by age and sex of a metropolitan district in 1960 as an aid in predicting its number of employed workers. Actually the number of available jobs may markedly affect the future size of the population. In more general terms, population is not an independent variable but instead it interacts with other variables—economic, social, and political.

These other variables affect the natural increase of a population. Within the probable range of events, however, they have a much greater effect upon migration. Nowadays internal migration is numerically much more important than immigration and emigration, so the future growth of a part of the country is much more influenced by migration, and in turn by cultural factors, than is that of the United States as a whole. The chief area of uncertainty in the future growth of a State or city is its net migration to or from other parts of the country. This net migration depends upon many factors. Examples are: (1) The relative number and attractiveness of job opportunities in the given area as compared with other areas, (2) the accessibility of the area, (3) the area's housing accommodations and its shopping, educational, and recreational facilities, and (4) the information or misinformation that potential migrants have about conditions in the area. Hence, it should be apparent that the demographer would like to have a variety of other predictions before making his own forecasts. These are rarely available, however.

In making forecasts of population, one is aided by having a good estimate of the *current* population, since the last census is now seven years past. The latest estimate that the Census Bureau

*Read by the senior author before the Texas Conference on Population Research at College Station, Texas, May 2, 1947. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of several members of the Population Statistics Section without which the projections could never have been prepared in time and particularly to thank Mrs. Helen R. White for preparing the estimates by the logarithmic curve.

has published for the State of Texas is as of July 1, 1945.¹ This estimate was constructed by first estimating the November, 1943 population chiefly on the basis of registrations for War Ration Book Number 4, subsequent natural increase was next added, and the net loss to the armed forces was subtracted. Finally, net civilian migration was allowed for by assuming that the indicated net out-migration from Texas between 1940 and 1943 continued to 1945 but at a reduced rate. This method is admittedly a very rough one for estimating the migration during the latter part of the war.

For July 1, 1945, the civilian population plus armed forces stationed in Texas was estimated at 6,787,000, the civilian population alone at 6,338,000. The natural increase since the 1940 census had been 554,000. The estimated net loss through civilian migration was trivial, only 2,600. The net loss to the armed forces was 602,000. Since that time the high postwar birth rate has added a considerable number to the natural increase. Most of the men and women in the service in July, 1945, have undoubtedly returned to civilian life in Texas by now. By a rough extension of the method used for 1945, the total population of Texas in July, 1946 (excluding persons serving in the armed forces outside the State) may be estimated at about 7,000,000.

Estimates of population by States for July 1, 1946, are now in preparation. They will make use of empirical data on net migration for the period since November, 1943. Specifically, we hope to get the rate of net migration from a comparison of the expected elementary school enrollment (allowing for births and deaths only since the base date) with the actual enrollment. This procedure is summarized in a recent article by Hope T. Eldridge of the Census Bureau. The article is entitled "Suggested Procedures for Estimating the Current Population of Counties," and is No. 4 in our Series P-47. The method is also appropriate to making estimates for States and cities.

We should like to encourage the Texas population project to experiment with the construction of State estimates by other methods, including some using source data that are not available to us. The pooling of knowledge should be mutually beneficial. Current estimates have many uses, of course, beyond serving as a starting

¹U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Population—Special Reports*, "Estimated Population of the United States, by States: 1940 to 1945", Series P-46, No. 3, February 12, 1946.

Since this article was read, an estimate for July 1, 1946, has been published and an estimate for July 1, 1945, has been revised. See *Current Population Reports*, "Estimated Population of the United States, by Regions, Divisions, and States: July 1, 1946," Series P-25, No. 2, August 15, 1947.

point for the projection of population growth into the future. Many of the same techniques are used in making estimates for current and future periods. At present the Bureau's staff is not large enough to produce county and city estimates. We can only give advice to, and consult with, local technicians who wish to work on the problem.

Having brought the population more nearly up to date, we are ready to proceed with projections into the future. Increasing attention is being paid to this problem by demographers. Frank Lorimer devoted a chapter to "Estimates of Future Population" in his *Suggested Procedure for Population Studies by State Planning Boards*.² This is a discussion of several methods and does not present any series of forecasts.

Thompson and Whelpton of the Scripps Foundation in 1934 prepared estimates through 1960 by States.³ Since these estimates were prepared during the depression, the authors were led to expect a more rapid decline in natural increase than has actually occurred or now seems likely to occur. Their estimates for Texas were as follows:⁴

Date	No internal migration	Migration like 1920-30
1940	6,483,000	6,447,000
1950	7,078,000	6,952,000
1960	7,518,000	7,255,000

The enumerated population of Texas in 1940 was 6,414,824, which is slightly lower than either of the estimates for that date. On the other hand, our rough estimate for 1946 is 7,000,000, and if it is approximately correct the population in 1950 will be well above either of the Thompson and Whelpton estimates. The unexpectedly high birth rates of the forties are the major part of the explanation.

Recent studies that deal with the future population of particular States or cities are V. B. Stanbery's for California and Sacramento⁵ and Warren S. Thompson's for the Cincinnati area.⁶ Of these the

²Washington, National Resources Committee, 1938.

³National Resources Board. *Estimates of Future Population by States*, Washington, 1934.

⁴Estimates made comparable with census figures by deleting an allowance made for underenumeration of children under 5 years old.

⁵California State Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission. *Estimated range for population growth in California to 1960*, Sacramento, November, 1946, and *Forecasting a city's future: Sacramento, California*, Pamphlet No. 12, 1946.

⁶Cincinnati City Planning Commission. *The population of the Cincinnati Metropolitan Area*. December, 1945.

Cincinnati study is the most elaborate, but even here the allowance for net migration was on an arbitrary basis. The unit of in-migration used was in no sense a prediction of the number of in-migrants expected; it was a convenient unit used for statistical purposes only. To quote Thompson:

"... since migration into any community is largely a matter of its economic attraction in competition with other communities, it is impossible of estimation within reasonable limits in the same way as birth rates and death rates.

"In order to make a single reasonable estimate of net future migration into Cincinnati or any other large metropolitan district one would have to know a great deal more about the fixed intentions of employers in the Cincinnati Area than is now known. It should be added, that for the employers to have definite plans for future expansion they, in turn, would need to know more than they possibly can about future economic conditions in the United States and in the world."

We regret that we have been unable to consider these factors either. To do so requires a lot of time and a thorough knowledge of the economy of Texas, of which we possess neither. Any local research program, however, should study these factors and take them into account before trying to estimate the future population of Texas.

In the time available, it was possible to prepare estimates based on only a few of the many sets of reasonable assumptions that might be made. Our standard techniques had to be simplified considerably. Even then many man-days of work were required, and it should be recognized that the preparation of a systematic set of estimates of Texas' future population utilizing the best available techniques represents an ambitious program.

Let us consider first, however, a very simple method. The past growth of Texas can fairly be described as phenomenal. In its frontier period it is not surprising that the State's share of the country's population was increasing. Unlike some other Western States, however, Texas has continued to have an increasing share of the national growth. The percentage of the American population residing in Texas is still increasing, but the curve of this function is flattening out. A logarithmic curve has been fitted to these percentages and extrapolated to predict the values from 1950 to 1975.⁸ For the future population of the United States, we have

⁷*Op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁸Tying in the growth of a State or city with that of the nation brings out the point that there is a ceiling on local growth. The outstanding population increases in the past century have been due to migration. As the growth of the

used the new medium fertility and mortality, no net immigration, estimates that were published in a recent census release.⁹

The results are as follows:

Date	Estimated percentage of U. S. population	Estimated population of Texas
1940	4.87	6,414,824
1945	5.00	*
1950	5.02	7,302,000
1955	5.10	7,642,000
1960	5.18	7,945,000
1965	5.25	8,226,000
1970	5.32	8,504,000
1975	5.39	8,750,000

**Not comparable with other figures.*

These estimates are 3 percent higher than Thompson and Whelpton's higher estimates for 1950 and 6 percent higher for 1960.

Next let us consider some estimates based on a methodology more similar to that used by Thompson and Whelpton. The simplest of these is one in which we assume no in- or out-migration and predict the future natural increase. We must have a set or sets of age-specific survival rates and a set or sets of age-specific maternal fertility rates. Starting with a current set, we must provide for changes since it is highly unlikely that age-specific mortality and fertility rates will remain constant.

With regard to the quantity and quality of demographic data available for this purpose, Texas is among the poorest States. The State came into the Birth and Death Registration Areas in 1933—the last State to enter. There is no published life table. Under-registration of births is estimated at 14.1 percent in 1940 and at 10.8 percent in 1944.¹⁰ For nonwhites underregistration is esti-

United States slows down, there will be fewer potential migrants elsewhere in the country to supply these rapid local growths. Thus, on the average, they should be fewer and less marked. This consideration is not particularly relevant to the State of Texas, which has apparently not had a net in-migration in recent years; but it is relevant to many of its cities.

⁹U. S. Bureau of the Census. *Population—Special Reports*, "Forecasts of the Population of the United States, by Age and Sex: 1945 to 2000," Series P-46, No. 7, September 15, 1946.

¹⁰National Office of Vital Statistics. *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, "Estimated Completeness of Birth Registration: United States, 1935 to 1944," 23(10), September 30, 1946.

mated at 28.8 percent in 1944. With these deficits, it is likely that there is some underregistration of deaths also, particularly of infant deaths. Underenumeration of children under 5 at the last census is thought to be 7.9 percent for whites and 11.9 percent for non-whites.¹¹ Underenumeration at other ages is probably greater than in the United States as a whole, and the misreporting of age is also worse. Allowances for these items are obviously subject to error and introduce flaws into the projections. The basic data have been adjusted for the major shortcomings, but one's confidence is somewhat shaken.

For this paper, abridged Texas life tables by sex and color were constructed for 1939-40. The expectation of life for white males is 60.3 or 2.3 years less than the United States average. Infant mortality, in particular is relatively high. In 1945, the infant mortality rate for Texas was 48.4 as compared with 38.3 for the United States. On the other hand, infant mortality has been dropping slightly faster in Texas than in the country as a whole. From 1933 to 1945 the respective declines were 36 and 34 percent. It is somewhat more difficult to compare age-specific mortality rates, but it has been generally found that in areas where mortality has been highest the rate of decline has been greatest. Thus it is fairly certain that the Texas rates are converging with the United States average.

It has therefore been assumed that half the differences in survival rates between Texas and the United States observed in 1939-40 will have disappeared by 1975 except above age 65 where the rates have been continued unchanged. A downward trend in these rates is also assumed for the United States, namely, the "medium" assumption of the new forecasts. With the diffusion to the worse areas of the progress that has already been made in the better areas, a considerable reduction in national mortality will occur. Furthermore, we may readily anticipate continued advances in sanitation, public health, hospital facilities, diagnosis, nutrition, chemotherapy, and other medical research.

All three mortality assumptions (high, medium, and low) represent a downward trend.¹² The trends are characterized by a relatively large decrease at the younger ages and a relatively small decrease at the older ages. Under the medium assumptions, mortality rates tend to level off after 1990. Native white males may be

¹¹U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Population. Differential fertility: 1940 and 1910. Standardized fertility rates and reproduction rates*. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1944.

¹²See the forthcoming report, Bureau of the Census, *Forecasts of the Population of the United States, 1945-1975*, G.P.O., Washington, D.C. 1947.

used to illustrate the medium pattern for 1939-40 to 2000. Infant mortality declines 55 percent, mortality in the teens and early adult life drops 60 percent, and there is a gradual fading off of the improvement to age 70, after which age current rates are assumed to continue. The implicit expectation of life at birth is 67.8 in 1975 as compared with 62.6 in 1939-40. Death rates for other sex-color groups were obtained by assuming a moderate convergence between them and those for native white males.

The expectation of life at birth for Texas white males in 1975 would be 67.6 years according to our assumptions. This figure represents a rise of 7.3 years from the 60.3 years prevailing in 1939-40. For comparison, the national average future lifetime of native white males is estimated to increase by only 5.2 years.

The picture with respect to fertility is somewhat similar. Texas' fertility is and has been relatively high. The gross reproduction rate for white women in 1935-1940 was 1,210 for Texas and 1,063 for the United States. Between 1905-1910 and this period, the respective declines were 51 and 39 percent. It seems likely that the rates will continue to converge. The fertility of nonwhite women is apparently lower in Texas than in the United States as a whole.

The long-established decline in American fertility was accelerated by the depression of the thirties. As a result of the economic and psychological concomitants of World War II, fertility has risen to heights not attained since the early twenties. The deficit in births induced by the depression has been more than compensated for. It is possible, however, that the high level of wartime and postwar fertility partly represents a borrowing from the future. In other words, women have had their first and second children earlier than they would have had them otherwise, but there will be no increase in the average size of their completed families. Most of the authorities feel that before long fertility will resume its historic downward trend.¹³ In fact, data adjusted for seasonal variation show a recession in the first four months of 1947 from the postwar peak reached in December, 1946.

The medium fertility estimates made by P. K. Whelpton and the Census Bureau for the United States assume the resumption of the decline between now and 1950. It was assumed that declines from year to year would gradually become smaller, so that the trend lines would be nearly horizontal after 2000. It is anticipated that

¹³For a more complete discussion of this problem, see: Whelpton, P. K., "Reproduction rates adjusted for age, parity, fecundity, and marriage" *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 41 (236): 501-516, December, 1946, and U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Population—Special Reports*, "Recent Trends in Population Replacement," Series P-47, No. 2, March 27, 1947.

by the year 2000 there will have been large declines (over 26 percent) in the rates for fourth and higher order births to native white women and small declines (under 7 percent) in the rates for births of lower orders. Correspondingly, the relative decrease by age is about 19 percent for women 15-19, drops to less than 10 percent for women 20-29, and then rises to 57 percent for women 40-44. A greater concentration of births in the first half of the childbearing period is thus assumed. Rates for foreign-born white and nonwhite women are assumed to approach those for native white women in the future.

According to the medium assumptions the gross reproduction rate for native white women in 1975 in the United States will be 960 as compared with 1063 for white women in 1935-40. Corresponding figures for white women in Texas are 1050 and 1210. These represent declines of 9.7 and 13.2 percent, respectively, between 1935-40 and 1975. It is assumed that half the difference between the age-specific fertility rates of Texas and the United States in 1939-1940 will disappear by 1975.

No predictions are made about the cyclical fluctuations above and below this trend that will be produced by prosperity and depression. The age-specific fertility rates are for "normal" economic conditions. For the period 1945 to 1950, the high national assumptions were used, because it was already apparent that the medium ones will be too low.

The State projections to 1975 were first made assuming no in- or out-migration. Between 1935 and 1940 there was a net out-migration from Texas to other States of about 23,000. Another set of estimates was made assuming this amount of net out-migration in each quinquennium. For simplicity it was subtracted at the end of each quinquennium and not distributed uniformly over the period. The out-migrants were given the age distribution observed in 1935 to 1940 and the age-specific fertility and mortality rates of the Texas nonmigrants of the pertinent quinquennium.

It may be recalled that Thompson and Whelpton found a net out-migration from Texas in the decade 1920 to 1930. Thornthwaite, however, computed a net in-migration of 288,000 for this same period.¹⁴ Using the age-survival method we have made a rough check which agrees fairly well with Thornthwaite's figure. If we are right, Texas experienced a fairly heavy net in-migration during a period of peacetime prosperity but just about "broke even" during the war. We leave it to the reader to judge whether the essential

¹⁴Thornthwaite, C. Warren. *Internal Migration in the United States*. (Study of Population Redistribution), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934, Plate VII.

conditions prevailing during the twenties are likely to be repeated. It would probably be well to examine the effect of, say, 100,000 net in-migrants every five years upon the forecasts. This amount would include an allowance for immigration from abroad, principally from Mexico. In the 1940 census, 9,108 persons then living in Texas reported themselves as having lived abroad in 1935. Whether this figure is confined to legal immigrants or also includes the "wetback" variety, is uncertain.

In addition to making various assumptions about migration, local statisticians would do well to work out projections assuming higher and lower fertility and mortality schedules than are assumed here. These might conceivably be tied in with the high and low assumptions for the United States that will be described in the forthcoming report cited above. A range of estimates for a State or local area seems even more imperative than for the nation. Once having made the estimates, one should not be charmed by the impressive set of tables into regarding them as covering all possible contingencies. The projections merely represent what will eventuate if the underlying schedules of fertility, mortality, and migration are approximated by actual developments. Wars, natural disasters, epidemics, and technological or social revolutions are outside the set of assumptions.

The following table summarizes these estimates and provides a comparison with the estimates discussed earlier:

COHORT-SURVIVAL METHODS

Date	Shryock and Siegel		Thompson and Whelpton, 1934		Projected ratio method
	No net migration	Net out-migration like 1935-1940	No net migration	Net out-migration like 1920-1930	
1950	7,382,000	7,359,000	7,078,000	6,952,000	7,302,000
1955	7,749,000	7,702,000	--	--	7,642,000
1960	8,076,000	8,001,000	7,518,000	7,255,000	7,945,000
1965	8,396,000	8,291,000	--	--	8,226,000
1970	8,707,000	8,569,000	--	--	8,504,000
1975	8,972,000	8,799,000	--	--	8,750,000

The estimates we have prepared by what we will call the "cohort-survival" method agree fairly well with those prepared by extrapolating Texas' share of the national total. They are considerably higher than the earlier estimates made by Thompson and Whelpton. The estimate assuming net out-migration like that in the 1935-40 period is only 173,000 less than the "no-migration" estimate for 1975. In the projections a total of 138,000 migrants was

subtracted at five-year intervals. The difference between these two figures is the estimated natural increase of the migrants.

Our Texas estimate for 1975 assuming no migration would represent an increase of about 40 percent over 1940. The 1975 estimate made on similar assumptions for the United States represents an increase of only 23 percent.

The cohort-survival method yields many valuable by-products, such as the distribution of the population by age, sex, and color at each estimate date. We will take time to note only one simple example. This is the distribution of the total population into three broad functional age groups: The productive ages, dependent children, and dependent aged.

Age group	Number		Percent	
	1975*	1940	1975*	1940
Total	8,972,000	6,414,824	100.0	100.0
0-14	2,060,000	1,796,567	23.0	28.0
15-64	5,994,000	4,270,762	66.8	66.6
65 and over	918,000	347,495	10.2	5.4

*No net migration

It is well known that there have been wide differentials in population growth between one part of Texas and another. The development of the oil industry, the mechanization of cotton culture, the movement from farms to cities, and the drought of the mid-thirties affected some areas considerably more than others.

Dr. O. E. Baker while at the Bureau of Agricultural Economics developed for the Census Bureau geographic subregions for each of the States. These subregions are groups of counties. Those for Texas comprise six metropolitan subregions (El Paso, Ft. Worth, Dallas, San Antonio, Houston, and Beaumont-Port Arthur) and 11 other subregions. The average annual per cent of increase in the total population of each subregion has been computed for 1920 to 1930 and 1930 to 1940 and in the civilian population for 1940 to 1943.

Except for the El Paso metropolitan county, all of the metropolitan counties experienced population growth in all three periods. Annual rates of growth were much higher in the twenties than in the thirties, but, despite the losses to the armed forces, there were sharp accelerations in the early forties. Hauser has examined the postwar prospects of population growth for all metropolitan areas.¹⁵

¹⁵Hauser, Philip M. "Wartime population changes and postwar prospects," *Journal of Marketing*, January, 1944, pp. 238-248.

He has judged these prospects on the basis of the consistency of the population change over the three periods above. For example, it was thought that a metropolitan area that had had a large wartime growth would be highly likely to retain its wartime gains if it had also had relatively rapid growth in a period characterized by peacetime prosperity (the twenties) and depression (the thirties). The areas rated A-1 were those which had grown most rapidly since 1940 and in the preceding period and which were, therefore, on the basis of past growth alone adjudged to have *superior* prospects of retaining wartime growth. Of the six metropolitan subregions above, the Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio ones were given this rating. Beaumont-Port Arthur and Ft. Worth were rated A-2, which means that they grew at above average rates during the course of the war and in the preceding period and were adjudged to have *excellent* prospects of retaining wartime population. El Paso's rating was B, the rating for metropolitan areas which had grown most rapidly since the onset of the war but at a substantially lower relative rate in the preceding decade and of which the wartime growth was expected to be transient unless special effort was made after the war to convert their wartime facilities to peacetime pursuits. (Among the smaller metropolitan areas, Corpus Christi and Galveston were rated A-1; Amarillo, A-2; Waco, B; and Austin, C-1. C-1 signifies an area that lost population or increased relatively little during the course of the war but that grew at an above-average rate between 1930 and 1940—and in most cases between 1920 and 1930—and that is therefore believed to have an excellent postwar prospect of "coming back".)

These ratings may be compared with the extent to which discharged servicemen have migrated into the area as shown by sur-

Area	Hauser rating	Percent of veterans living outside the area prior to induction	Percent of veterans planning to leave the area
Beaumont-Port Arthur	A-2	23	8
El Paso	B	19	4
Fort Worth	A-2	24	5
Houston	A-1	20	3
San Antonio	A-1	23	4
Austin	C-1	32	6
Waco	B	24	5

veys made by the Census Bureau in 1946 for the National Housing Administration.¹⁰

The number of cases here is small and the range of the indices is narrow (there are no C-2 or D metropolitan counties in Texas), so that it is difficult to evaluate the correspondence. For all available areas in the United States, it has been found that there is a significant positive correlation between the Hauser ratings and the percentage of veterans living outside the area prior to induction. This correlation indicates that veterans are migrating in the post-war period to the areas that have had consistently rapid population growth before and during the war. The areas are also probably attracting other types of migrants.

As for the subregions outside of the important metropolitan counties, only 3 out of 11 show an increase in all three periods. Thus outside of the metropolitan subregions, the areas with population growth in war and peace, prosperity and depression, are what Baker calls the "High Plains Grain and Grazing Areas", "High Plains Cotton Areas", and "Coastal Prairie". Areas of consistent population decrease are the "Cross Timber" and "Black and Grand Prairies". The smaller declines in civilian population between 1940 and 1943 have probably been reversed by demobilization in 1945 and 1946. Nevertheless, the present figures probably represent the relative recent growth of the subregions fairly well.

The high rates of population increase found in the metropolitan subregions are obviously due to net in-migration rather than to superior natural increase. We have not had time to investigate the natural increase among the other subregions, but we are sure that the losses are due to out-migration rather than to an excess of deaths over births. They are probably the areas that have shared least in the State's industrial and agricultural progress.

Between 1935 and 1940, out-migrants from Texas amounted to 283,165 and in-migrants to 263,034. Migrants from one county to another within Texas, however, numbered 889,607. About two-thirds of the in-migrants to its cities of 100,000 or more came from elsewhere within the State. In view of the vast area of the State and the high natural increase of its rural people, it is a little surprising that this proportion is not even higher. If it were possible to estimate for some future date the number of jobs that Texas industry and agriculture in competition with those of other States

¹⁰U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Survey of World War II veterans and dwelling unit vacancy and occupancy in _____," Series H-Vet., Nos. 1 to 112, June 28, 1946, to March 31, 1947.

could provide, it seems quite likely that natural increase alone would be able to provide the workers for these jobs. Migration from without would be unnecessary except in a few specialized occupations.

Some Tenure Implications of Wartime Land Transfers in the Southwest*

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War and post-war trends in the land market have been watched with a great deal of interest. Farm people have shown an awareness of the danger of another period of "boom and bust" land sales. Agricultural economists have studied the developments and the probabilities of the reoccurrence of certain problems associated with overpriced farm and ranch lands. Some are concerned primarily with the effects of land transfers on the relative efficiencies of farming operations. In addition, there are always economic and social changes associated with accelerated land market processes. Some of these changes are functional parts of the tenure system currently in operation in an area. Actually, land transfers are a simple measure of the ongoing ownership process as it constantly changes. It is our purpose here to discuss some of the aspects of tenure change that have been associated with the land market.

A BACKGROUND

Several facts of the wartime land market situation are necessary as a background for discussing tenure implications of this market. Briefly these are:

1. The volume of voluntary transfers has been large in relative terms. Within our four-state area these transfers have been at the average annual rate of about 50 farms per thousand for the five years, 1942-46. This means that one in every four farms in the area has changed ownership during the combined war and post-war period. (Resales of the same farms amounted to considerably less than 10 percent of all transfers).

These transfer rates vary among the states and areas involved. In some counties, representative of larger type of farming areas,

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All land market data presented in this discussion were taken from one of two sources:

1. *The Farm Real Estate Situation, 1945-46*, USDA Circular No. 754, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA.
2. *Quarterly and Annual Land Market Summaries*, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA, and State Agricultural Experiment Stations, cooperating.

the amount of farm land changing hands during the period is considerably more than one-third of the total land in farms.

2. Perhaps the more spectacular factor of war and post-war land sales lies in the prices paid for land. In general, in 1946 these prices had increased about two-thirds above the base period prices, 1935-39.

As in the case of transfers, there is variation in prices between states from a high index in March, 1946, of 193 in Arkansas to 159 in Louisiana, or prices were almost double pre-war values in Arkansas and were about three-fifths greater than prices of the base period in Louisiana. Prices of land in Oklahoma and Texas lie between these two extremes.

In many large areas, such as the Edwards Plateau grazing country of Texas, prices have more than doubled since pre-war and now exceed the high prices of the post-war period of World War I.

3. Farmers have been the principal buyers of land during this period. In fact, two out of every three purchasers in the four-state region have been active farmers. Relatively high incomes have placed increasingly greater amounts of liquid funds in the hands of the farmer. He has used these surplus funds in the manner apparently common to agricultural people—invested in land.

4. In the Region one-half or more of all transactions have been for cash. Such proportion of cash sales is high in terms of ordinary, or normal land transfer processes. Buyers' equity in credit sales at time of purchase has been high, or about one-half. Total equity of purchasers in all transactions, therefore, has run exceedingly high.

With these brief facts in mind we can proceed with some specific tenure considerations associated with the land market process.

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

One of the most important aspects of tenure, that is, ownership and control of farmland, is suggested by the fact that the farmer has been the largest factor in the land market from the purchase standpoint, both in numbers, and total acres purchased (Table 1). Although from the latter standpoint the farmer has exceeded purchases of non-farmer groups by only a small amount (Table 2). The fact that about two-thirds of all buyers have been farmers indicates that in numbers the farmer-buyer has been more than a bystander in the market-place.

If a similar proportion of sellers had been farmers, the total picture of ownership perhaps would not have changed a great deal. That is, transferring land from one farmer to another would have

TABLE 1. PROPORTION OF PURCHASERS WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE FARMERS, WEST SOUTH CENTRAL STATES*, 1941-46.

Year	Percent
1941	72
1942	68
1943	66
1944	68
1945	64
1946	62

*Includes Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Texas.

resulted in no greater control among farmers as a group, although the effect on individual farmers might have been quite variable. However, since the principal sellers of farmlands have been non-farm individuals and organizations, the tendency has been to further ownership and control in the hands of bona-fide farmers. The result was a net gain in ownership of land by farmers, amounting to about one-fourth the total acreage transferred (Table 2). In other words, farmers bought this much more land than they sold. Equity purchased at the time of transaction has been proportionately large, thus tending to further control among farmers.

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF ACRES TRANSFERRED BY CLASSES OF BUYER AND SELLER, WEST SOUTH CENTRAL STATES, 1942-46.

	<i>Percent bought</i>	<i>Percent sold</i>	<i>Percent change</i>
All farmers	55	30	+25
Owners	51	—	—
Tenants	4	—	—
Non-farmers	45	70	-25

In terms of broad tenure significance the process of transfer of a greater degree of ownership to farmers is more than just an interesting phenomenon. We can say with some certainty that one of the general tenure objectives of the nation has been a greater degree of land ownership by the man who tills the soil. Apparently, the war and post-war land transfers in these states have tended toward a broad achievement of this objective.

TENURE STATUS

To say that a greater degree of ownership has been achieved by farmers is not enough. It is necessary to examine such trends

more closely to indicate tenure status change among farmers as a group. We should know, for example, among all farmers, who are those buying their way to owner-operatorship? Have farmers of different tenure status groups participated in the land market to the same degree? Has there been a significant number of farmers climbing the tenure ladder?

Some implications of these factors are more or less obvious. Others are not so easily recognized.

Primarily, the farmer buyers of land have been those who were already owner-operators of farm units. Apparently such has been the case in the areas producing chiefly for the market, or in what might be termed the more productive lands. In most instances the intent of the buyer was to operate the purchased tract with land already owned, indicating that the purchase was made to "round out" an operating unit. In some instances acreage has been added to already large units, or what might have been considered adequate units. Evidently, owner-operators have been the farm group in a strong position in the land market. Gains from technology have been used to raise farm income by increasing size of operations rather than increasing intensity of operations. In seeking land the owner-operator has been able to outbid the weaker economic groups, perhaps making his position even stronger.

The first two war years saw the farm tenant as an important segment of the land market. Although, in this Region he apparently has not held the important place in the land market that he has in some other regions of the United States. Increased incomes, before commensurate rises in land prices, gave many hundreds of tenants the opportunity for which they had been waiting. Apparently, there are significant numbers of tenants who will seek ownership status if an opportune moment arises. The opportune moment of this period did not last long for the tenant. With rising land prices he soon "fell by the way", so to speak, and was no longer an important buyer of land.

For example, in Oklahoma, the proportion of buyers who were tenants dropped from approximately 30 percent in 1941 to less than 10 percent as early as 1944. In Texas in 1946, only 6 percent of all buyers were tenants. In some areas the tenant has disappeared almost completely from the land market. Perhaps he could not compete in a situation of rising prices and at the same time invest in the new equipment required by advancing technology. In those areas where the tenant yet remains as a sizable factor in buying, land utilization is characterized more or less by small, inefficient, or self-sufficing units. It may be that there is a sacrifice of eco-

conomic returns to achieve ownership in such localities. The advisability of such procedure is open to question, although there are those who maintain that the social gains might outweigh these economic sacrifices.

Data from the 1945 Census of Agriculture can be said to indicate some tenure status changes in the Region.

The heretofore unequaled land buying on the part of farmers is reflected in the increase in owner-operators. In Oklahoma, for example, full owners increased in numbers from about 56,000 in 1940 to around 71,000 in 1945. Tenants dropped in number from approximately 98,000 to 66,000. The proportion of tenancy showed unprecedented decline from 54.4 percent to 39.9 percent of all operators. Other states of the Region show similar trends although not to the extent found in Oklahoma.

One rather obvious implication exists in these changes. In terms of the national tenure goal of owner-operatorship, parts of the Region appear well on the way toward achievement of this end. In other words, to a degree we have changed from a high tenancy area to one of relatively high owner-operatorship.

Tenure status changes associated with the land market do not indicate a great degree of ascent of the tenure ladder, unless it is contended that in strengthening his position the owner-operator actually has climbed upward. With due respect to this contention, it still may be said that not a great deal of climbing has been done. Instead, those already at the top, or near the top of the ladder, apparently have taken a firmer grip on their position. Owner-operators became larger owner-operators with more resources and a larger investment, but still owner-operators. Those in a less favorable position in agriculture, primarily tenants in this instance, left farming completely. To be sure some tenants were climbing the ladder in the two early years of the period, as pointed out above. However, while reaching for the top rung of the ladder, too many may have sacrificed some economic returns in favor of the hoped for social gains through owning their own land.

The status of those who remain as tenant-operators is difficult to evaluate as related to the land market. It is evident that these operators are more than ever concentrated on land owned by non-farm occupational groups. As mentioned earlier non-farmer buyers, though only about one-third of all buyers, actually purchased nearly one-half), or 45 percent of the land area transferred (Table 2.) With due allowance and exception for two categories of non-farmer buyers, those who bought that long desired "place in the country", and those who bought as a part-time security venture,

the units purchased by these non-farm occupational groups were apparently of large size, or perhaps of adequate size, and to an extent concentrated in the farming areas producing for the market. In view of these conditions, and the possibility that these new owners might be willing to spend increased incomes for needed farm improvements, tenants may have made some gain in the land transfer processes. Possibly, these changes in ownership might have led, or will lead, to basic improvements in leasing arrangements and provisions, but at the moment no information is available that would warrant such a conclusion.

FAMILY FARM

In view of the general objective of the "family farm" in agriculture, is the trend toward, or away from this ideal?

This question is difficult to answer. However, an assumption that the family farm is in a stronger position now than before the war-time land transfers appears valid, if at the same time we assume that those who left agriculture have made a permanent transition (admittedly a questionable assumption). One of the chief land resource problems of these four states for many years has been termed "too small farms", too small in terms of productive employment for the farm family, and also in terms of total farm income. Thousands of the war-time land transfers were an attempt on the part of owner-operators to do something about these "too small farms". The largest proportion of transactions were to add an additional land tract to what previously had been an operating unit.

A casual examination of trends might lead to a careless evaluation of increasingly larger operating units as related to the family farm. For example, the trend toward progressively larger tenure units have led some to think that these farms were growing away from the Nation's ideal. However, it is necessary to think of the family farm as a dynamic concept. The High Plains, though an extreme case, may serve as an illustration. Bonnen and Magee have pointed out that the family of the 1920's could care for only about 100 acres of cropland in dryland farming.¹ In 1938 the amount that a family could tend properly had grown to 450 acres. There is little doubt that the High Plains family of 1946 with adapted techniques could handle a still larger acreage—perhaps as much as a section of cropland.

¹Bonnen, C. A., and Magee, A. C., "Some Technological Changes in the High Plains Cotton Area of Texas," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. XX, No. 3, August, 1938, p. 610.

We have said that the family type farm appeared to have gained in the Region. There are exceptions to this general conclusion. Within the four states, large areas exist that have benefited to only a limited degree from advancing technology. Here are found a large proportion of the "too small farms". Adjustment toward larger units through the land market processes, where such adjustment is so obviously necessary, has been at a minimum. It is of no minor significance that the number of farms increased in Haskell and Latimer counties, Oklahoma—an area of very limited agricultural possibilities. The increase in the number of farms in such localities as Tarrant and Dallas counties, Texas, are part-time ventures definitely related to the industrial opportunities nearby. The increase in farms in the former counties bears no relationship to industrial opportunities. It is in such localities that the family farm, in terms of either labor requirements or size of income, has gained only a little headway during the war and post-war adjustment period. Even during 1940-1944, period of exceptional income, self-sufficing or "home use" farms held their own proportionately or gained headway in some states—as in Louisiana.

Another discordant element in the family type farm gains must be noted. Undoubtedly, there have been some adjustments toward larger than family farms. At present it is not possible to measure the extent of this occurrence. Although size in acres is not conclusive, it is indicative that there was a sharp increase in Oklahoma in the farms over 500 acres, and over 1000 acres in size. In terms of gross income, for example, the number of farms in this State having over \$10,000 in 1944 were over seven times as many as in 1939. More than 17 percent of all farms in the State had gross incomes over \$4,000 in 1944, as contrasted to slightly less than three percent of the farms in this income group in 1939. Of course, we cannot say that all these units were larger than the family farm. Perhaps most of these increased incomes in 1945 were a result of war swollen returns. However, within these groups it is safe to assume that some of the increases were due to larger than family units which were created through the land transfer processes of the war period.

SOME FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

Up to this point we have noted several tenure implications of war and post-war land transfers. Specifically these are:

1. Ownership of farmland has shifted to a great degree into the hands of the farming population.
2. Proportionately, tenure status of farm operators has changed

from relatively high tenancy to relatively high owner-operatorship. The shift involved not a general climbing of the tenure ladder, but an elimination of many clinging to the ladder. Those at the top appeared to take a stronger hold on their position, eliminating those non-owning operators on the rungs below.

3. The family farm, in terms of adequate size, appeared to have made considerable gains in the war time land transfer processes, particularly in certain areas. What might be larger than the family type farm apparently gained in numbers.

4. Combining the two objectives, owner-operatorship and family farm, it appears that extensive achievements were made in this Region toward the national tenure goal of owner operated-family farms.

In addition to these implications there are others of a broader, yet of a no less significant nature.

Some of the associated land market factors in the trends toward larger, and therefore fewer farms cannot be ignored. Inevitably, in this process there are created "landless" people. If better opportunity is afforded these landless outside agriculture, well and good. Fortunately, this has been the case since 1940. However, what are the prospects for the future? We are told that, "conditions in the years ahead will be favorable for expanding the use of machinery despite the fact that labor will be more plentiful and farm product prices and incomes will be lower".² As pointed out above, this fact means purchase of additional land on the part of those who expand the use of machinery. In this process will the now "submerged" areas of agriculture in the region become a target for further submergence if opportunities for those made landless begin to diminish? Will there arise a permanent farm labor class, migratory in its function, and with widespread social consequences for the rural areas?

With the constant pressure for larger farms through application of technology, investment in both farmland and equipment is progressively increasing. Will these larger investments impede the rise of farm tenants and laborers to ownership? Also, existing in the situation is competitive pressure for additional land. Such competitive pressure provides incentive and opportunity to increase rents (land values), further adding to the difficulty of climbing the tenure ladder.

The trend of land sales expressed in tract combination for larger and larger tenure units, merits further consideration. On the one

²*Farm Cost Situation*, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A., March 17, 1947, release, p. 7.

hand, many operators have realized a more adequate unit through personal efficiency in operation and in skilled application of technological advancements. On the other hand there is the likelihood that some gains have come about from subsidization of those already in a strong tenure position. In wartime perhaps it was to be expected that the "10 percent who produce the 50 percent" of the total farm product would receive the greater share of the incentives to expand. If the war had continued for a longer period, or until the Nation was in critical need of manpower, efficiency in the use of human labor would have been the only question involved in land use, regardless of land tenure goals. However, in peacetime there may be some question as to the compatibility of tenure goals and that portion of operational efficiency that can be assessed to various types of public assistance. Only recently this was brought forcibly to national attention when the President of the United States said in his budget message:

"More than 60 percent of the total payments (speaking of agricultural benefit payments of 311 million dollars of previous year) go to about one-eighth of farmers. Most of this money thus is being paid to farmers who, because of their strong position in American agriculture would undoubtedly continue the best farm management practices without the persuasion of a bonus from the Treasury".³

Encouragements to the strong operator to expand, resulting primarily in the purchase of more land by fewer farmers, have not always taken the form of direct cash assistance. We have seen within the Region the growth of farm labor recruitment, migratory labor camps, medical aid and general guidance to migratory laborers, all general aids to those operators who have expanded enough to have critical need of substantial amounts of labor, other than that of the farm family. These types of assistance performed a useful service for the Nation in promoting greater food production in a time of national stress. But what is the nature of their influence on the family farmer? Can he compete in the land market, and therefore in the long run in production, with the larger operator who undoubtedly has more to gain from the advantages provided by these public services?

Finally, tenure implications of the land market would not be complete without detailed comment on credit transactions. During the war years, credit was used relatively conservatively, and incomes increased year by year. Under these circumstances there

³*Congressional Record*, Vol. 93, No. 7, Jan. 10, 1947, p. 260.

hardly could have been a post-war foreclosure problem and subsequent loss of farm ownership such as that which followed the World War I. However, recent information indicates that credit is being used much more extensively. Many transactions are financed wholly by credit. Equity in other transactions is decreasing to the point where the amount of credit used by the buyer is more than was the total price of the land in 1942. The prevailing types of creditors, that is, individuals and commercial banks, may lend further insecurity to these transactions. The repayment provisions used by these lenders generally do not grant enough time for loan amortization, as recognized by good farm mortgage practice of today. Interest rates apparently are running rather high on some of these credit transfers. Provisions that today seem reasonable with present high returns, may become extremely burdensome in future years with falling prices and lower incomes. If these latter developments of the land market continue, there is a possibility that the post-war land market may result in considerable loss of ownership and control of land by farm people.

Legal Acceptance of Correlative Rights in the Texas Panhandle Gas Field

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Three economic elements were involved in the 18-year struggle which resulted in the legal acceptance of correlative rights in the Panhandle natural gas field, the largest reservoir of a \$5,000,000,-000 industry.¹ The three elements with conflicting interests were (1) hundreds of individual land holders, (2) numerous owners and operators of gas wells, and (3) only a few markets in the form of pipe lines. Problems inherent in natural gas itself—drilling, transporting, and distributing—were complicating factors. The tendency of the gas to migrate in this vast field of more than 1,300,000 acres compelled the legal recognition of correlative rights. Three giants—Texas, the United States and the natural gas industry were involved in the struggle to conserve and administer this phenomenal natural resource.

The basis was laid in 1900 for the ultimate solution when the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the authority of a state to protect the conflicting interests of the producers of gas from a common reservoir.² The connection was tenuous, because in addition to the fact that this was an Indiana case, 18 years elapsed before the Panhandle field was discovered hundreds of miles away in Texas. Rampant exploitation did not press after the discovery in 1918,³ but in the 1920's there were three signifi-

¹Federal Trade Commission, *Reports, Monograph No. 36, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, Natural Gas and Natural Gas Pipe Lines in U. S. A.*, (Washington, 1940), 87; Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, *Hearings, Petroleum Investigation*, 73rd Congress (Recess), H. R. 441 (Washington, 1934) 2229-2231. (Hereafter cited *Hearings*, H. R. 441.)

²Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, *Petroleum Investigation Hearings*, 77th Congress, 3 Sess, H. R. 290 and H. R. 7372, (Washington, 1940), 1470. (Hereafter cited, *Petroleum Investigation*.)

³Charles N. Gould of the Oklahoma Geological Survey, first called attention to the prospective oil and gas in the Texas Panhandle in 1906-1907.—The University of Texas, *Bulletin No. 3501* (Austin, 1935) 45-47; United States Geological Survey, *Mineral Resources*, 1921, II, (Washington, 1922) 343; Victor Cotner and H. E. Crum, "Geology and the Occurrence of Natural Gas in the Amarillo District, Texas," in *Geology of Natural Gas*, Harry A. Ley (ed.) (Tulsa and London, 1935) 385-386, 390.

cant developments in the Panhandle gas field. Foremost was the organization of large marketing concerns, an interlocking connection with the second factor, a prodigious expansion of natural gas production. Third, the Texas Railroad Commission was given legal control of all gas pipe lines.⁴

To conceive the significance of the big marketing companies, it is necessary to understand that the four principal operations in the gas industry are production, extraction of by-products, transmission, and distribution. In general, the big firms operating in the Panhandle field placed acreages and leases in the control of land-holding companies. The actual production of the gas was performed by a drilling company. The collecting and purchasing of the product was the function of a third company, which in turn sold the gas to a pipe line company. The pipe line company disposed of the natural gas to utilities and by-product extraction companies. Dominating the entire structure generally was a single holding company. The Cities Service group, controlling more than a million acres of leases, may be considered an example.⁵ Ninety-eight per cent of the natural gas which this group distributed to 340,000 domestic consumers in 263 communities of Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Nebraska, came from the Panhandle field.⁶ More than twenty subsidiary companies performed the operations required in producing, transporting, and selling the gas.⁷ In a short time there developed three other large combinations of companies which dominated the industry—Electric Bond and Share, Columbia Gas and Electric, and the Standard Oil of New Jersey groups.⁸ Aside from these groups, the most imposing single company in this intricate corporate structure was the Natural Gas Pipe Line Company of America, chartered in Delaware, and an example of the willingness of big firms to cooperate. It was the property

⁴W. S. Summers, *The Law of Oil and Gas*, V, (Kansas City, 1939), 462.

⁵Not until about 1927 was natural gas piped more than 250 miles to consumers. By 1930, however, pipe lines 900 miles long were being laid.—Scott Turner, *Conservation of Natural Gas in Relation to Some Recent Developments*, United States Bureau of Mines, *Information Circular*, (Washington, 1930), 1-4; ———, "Nationwide Distribution of Gas Foreseen by Bureau of Mines Head," *Oil and Gas Journal*, (Tulsa, Okla.), October 23, 1930, XXIX, No. 23, 62, 66; Federal Trade Commission, *Final Report on Utility Corporations*, 1935, S. Doc. 92, No. 84-A, S. R. 93, 70th Cong. 1 Sess. (Washington, 1936), 55-80. (Hereafter cited, *Final Report on Utility Corporations*.)

⁶Special Committee of the United States Senate to Investigate the Fuel Situation in the Middle West, *Hearings*, 78th Cong., 1 Sess, S. R. 61, (Washington, 1943) 369, 371.

⁷*Final Report on Utility Corporations*, 232-241.

⁸*Ibid.*, 589.

of Cities Service, Standard Oil of New Jersey, The Texas Company, Skelly Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum Corporation, Columbia Carbon Company, and Insull, Son and Company. The purpose was to deliver Panhandle gas to the consumers of the Chicago district, a project requiring 900 miles of pipe line.⁹ These integrated companies were in a position to perform all the operations from production to delivery to the ultimate consumer.

In the expansion of the Panhandle production, leases were spread outward to cover an ultimate area about twenty miles wide and 125 miles long. The large firms distributed their holdings in checker-board fashion, rather than in contiguous blocks, a procedure which stimulated drilling because it left many scattered leases in the hands of small operators. The little independents, eager to gain revenues from the gas of their landholdings, drilled many wells to off-set those of the large companies. This off-set drilling resulted in great over-production of natural gas, the expression of each owner's intention to prevent a neighboring well from draining more than its share of the migratory mineral. The big firms, with their own leases, wells, and pipe lines, moved only their own gas to market, offering no outlets for the independent well owners.¹⁰ Great waste resulted. During 1926 and before, the total production was more than 247 billion cubic feet, of which nearly eighty-nine per cent was wasted into the air. In 1927, the total production was more than 505 billion cubic feet, with in excess of eighty per cent blown away. Two years later (1929) the total production was more than 625 billions of cubic feet with a waste of forty-seven per cent.¹¹ It was estimated that between 1926 and 1931 thirty per cent of all the gas produced in the Panhandle was "popped off," a wastage of nearly half a billion cubic feet daily.¹² In the conservation of this mighty resource the correlative rights of the numerous owners became vital.

Thus it was that the 1920's drew to an end with less than a dozen major pipe lines, or their affiliates, controlling more than three-fourths of the immense gas field and a large number of little companies owning less than a fourth. The little companies had no pipe line outlets for marketing.¹³ Then, under the stimulation of the

⁹House of Representatives, *Report No. 2192, Report on Pipe Lines, Part 2*, 72nd Cong. 2 Sess., H. R. No. 59 (Washington, 1933), 217-220.

¹⁰*Final Report on Utility Corporations*, 90-91.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 95.

¹²Harry S. Ley (ed.) *Geology of Natural Gas*, (Tulsa, London, 1935) 1094-1095.

¹³Other statements of the size of the field are numerous, since some consider the adjoining Oklahoma and Kansas gas production in the same reservoir. Geologically it may be. Only the Texas part is considered in this paper; Maurice

tremendous waste and the pleas of the independent well owners for legal relief, the Texas Legislature conferred the authority to control gas pipe lines on the state's Railroad Commission.¹⁴ Thus in 1928 the third significant event occurred in the struggle over the question of correlative rights.

Articulate and contentious economic interests had not been silent during the years of physical development. In addition to the large companies and the small independents, there were the owners of "sour" gas wells. Because their product contained sulphur, the "sour" gas owners were unable to sell to the pipe lines; but the excessive taking of the "sour" gas affected the potential production of the neighboring wells, whether "sweet" or "sour." The "sour" gas owners could sell legally in almost unlimited amounts to the carbon black plants. Obviously, that left the independent owners of "sweet" gas wells (free of sulphur) searching at least for some revenue from their investments. The natural recourse was to extract the gasoline and then free the natural gas that could not be sold. The gasoline extraction process called stripping, was legal when operated in conjunction with an oil well,¹⁵ but about 1930, F. C. Henderson, Inc., erected such a treating plant at a Panhandle gas well, for which the statutes did not provide. The Henderson plant treated and then freed 46,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas daily. Since the treated gas was unimpaired for commercial use, the operation of the plant was regarded as a great waste and it was stopped by the Railroad Commission. That order was upheld by the Federal courts.¹⁶ Consequently, additional gasoline extraction plants were not erected; but a powerful complaint arose from the owners of similar gas wells with no pipe line connections.¹⁷ The result was the enactment in 1931 of a law which sought to require the pipe line companies to purchase the gas of their neighbors.

The pipe line companies, since they produced adequate gas for their markets, could be relied on to resist vigorously any effort to force them to buy from the independents. In carrying out the terms of the law of 1931, the Railroad Commission divided the great Panhandle field into zones in each of which the production

Cheek, "Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas", in American Bar Association, *Mineral Law Symposium*, (Baltimore, 1938) 269-270. (Hereafter cited, Cheek.)

¹⁴*Final Report on Utility Corporations*, Appendix L-2, 84; *Vernon's Annotated Revised Texas Statutes* (Kansas City, 1927) Art. 6023.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Art. 6014.

¹⁶*F. C. Henderson, Inc., vs. Railroad Commission*, 56 F (2d) 218 and 287 U. S. 672.

¹⁷Cheek, 273-274.

of all the wells was equalized. The wells of the big companies were choked to about four per cent of their potential production. The effect of the order, in short, was to give the big companies the alternative of having inadequate gas from their own wells or of buying from their neighbors.¹⁸ The pipe line companies replied that they were not purchasers of gas, but merely transporters of their own production. The statute, moreover, was denounced as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and also in conflict with interstate commerce. The federal courts upheld the contentions of the pipe line companies, while calling attention to the fact that the intention was to enforce the equitable principle of correlative rights indirectly through compulsory purchase. The court ruled that a private carrier engaged in interstate commerce could not be required to become a common purchaser.¹⁹ The rules of the Railroad Commission approached the problem on the pretext of preventing waste, but the big companies could prove they had not been guilty of that—it was the independent operators who were. In a second decision before the close of 1932, the Federal courts ruled that on the theory of protecting correlative rights the Railroad Commission was without authority to close wells to prevent waste.²⁰ Thus the big pipe line companies remained practically unmolested, while the small operators were as dissatisfied as ever—still without a market.

That was the condition in 1932 when ten companies, operating almost 4,000 miles of pipe line, took more than ninety-four billion cubic feet of natural gas from the field each day.²¹ The completion of additional great gas wells increased the productive capacity of the field by billions of cubic feet.²² The small operators not only failed to gain revenue from their properties, but their gas was dissipated through the process of migration toward the flowing wells of the pipe line companies. That was shown by the wells of one independent company which were capped from 1930 to 1933, and during that time the pressure dropped from 390 to 340 pounds while the big companies refused to buy any of the output.²³ In December, 1932, the Railroad Commission endeavored again to pro-

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 274-275.

¹⁹*Texoma Natural Gas Company vs. Railroad Commission*, 59 F (2d) 750.

²⁰*Texoma Natural Gas Company vs. Terrell and Cities Service Gas Company vs. Terrell*, 2 F Supp. 168.

²¹Victor Cotner and H. E. Crum, "Geology and the Occurrence of Natural Gas in the Amarillo District, Texas," in *Geology of Natural Gas*, Harry A. Ley (ed.) 406.

²²United States Geological Survey, *Mineral Resources*, 1931, II, 351-352.

²³Federal Oil Conservation Board, *Report V*, October, 1932 (Washington, 1932) 56; *Final Report on Utility Corporations*, 195.

vide a market for the several independent operators through the proration of production in such a manner as to force the pipe lines to buy. This proration order was issued under the provisions of an act of 1932 which permitted allocation when production was beyond the market demand.²⁴

The Railroad Commission thus was attempting for the third time to open a market for the independent operators. First it had tried to compel the pipe lines to become common purchasers, and had been over-ruled in court.²⁵ Then it had attempted to coerce the pipe lines by pinching off the gas wells in specified zones or areas, only to be restrained again by an adverse decision.²⁶ Now the Railroad Commission sought the same end through allocation of production. Three large firms—the Canadian River Gas Company, the Cities Service Gas Company, and the Texoma Natural Gas Company—asked injunctions to prevent the enforcement of the proration order. In June, 1933, the court ruled that the landowner had the right to withdraw oil or gas, even though it might come from beneath his neighbor's property. The decision further declared that under the state's authority to prevent waste of a natural resource, the Railroad Commission was empowered to prorate the gas only when waste was committed. The opinion denied the validity of this proration order, which in effect would have compelled the big companies to share their marketing facilities with the little independents. The court agreed that the case involved the two significant questions of correlative rights and the prevention of waste. Despite the arguments of attorneys, the tribunal ruled that the law must be construed to apply only to the prevention of waste.²⁷

Even before that decision, several of the independent well owners had gained permits for the operation of gasoline extraction or stripping plants. The permits may have been acquired as a threat or weapon against the pipe lines, which were maintaining control of the market. The political power of the independents was shown by the fact that the legislature had amended the law, making it apply especially to the Panhandle Field, to permit stripping plants to extract gasoline from one-fourth of the open-flow capacity of the gas wells.²⁸ Previously, at the time of the Henderson decision,

²⁴Section 4, Acts of 1932, 4th Called Session, Texas Legislature; Vernon's *Annotated Civil Statutes*, Article 6049, Section 4.

²⁵*Texoma Natural Gas Company vs. Railroad Commission*, (D. C.) 59 F (2d) 750.

²⁶*Texoma Natural Gas Company vs. Terrell* (D. C.), 2 F Supp. 168.

²⁷*Canadian River Gas Company vs. Terrell*, *Cities Service Gas Company vs. Terrell*, *Texoma Natural Gas Company vs. Terrell*, Nos. 446, 4 F Supp. 222.

²⁸Cheek, 277-278.

gasoline extraction plants were legal only in processing the gas produced by oil wells.

In June, 1933, when the Canadian River gas case was won by the large companies, there were 34 gasoline extraction plants in the Panhandle field. A year later there were 41. During that period, the rate of processing the gas increased 77 per cent, however, while the amount of treated residue blown into the air grew nearly 147 per cent. This great increase was the result of processing a swelling amount of dry gas. That was shown by the fact that in 1933, the gasoline recovery was about six-tenths of a gallon from each thousand cubic feet, while the next year only a little more than four-tenths of a gallon was gained.²⁹ To show the waste in another way, in January, 1933, the daily average was 207,000,000 cubic feet blown into the air, while in December the waste was 502,000,000 cubic feet. The next year (1934) the figure mounted rapidly until the daily average was 863,000,000 cubic feet blown off, while in the first seven months of 1935 this waste exceeded a billion cubic feet daily.³⁰ The wastefulness of the extraction plants also was demonstrated in the calculated losses to the royalty owners. At the rate of three cents a gallon on the extracted gasoline, a total of \$3,600,000 would be paid in royalties. Whereas, if the natural gas were sold, and not blown into the air, the royalty owners would receive a total of \$57,700,000 from the estimated gas reserve.³¹

The Panhandle gas field had become the largest and most publicized waste of a natural resource in the United States. The waste of gas in the production of oil had been serious, and the losses in the inefficient manufacture of carbon black had been frowned on, but the blowing away by the stripping plants was far more excessive.³² The pipe lines and the oil companies (there were 50 oil pools in the field) protested that the extraction plants were ruining the gas pressure. The Lone Star Gas Company declared that a stripping plant reduced pressures over a radius of three to five miles.³³ It was asserted that a single stripping plant on a very small acreage would take more gas than any one of the big pipe lines. If such an owner were limited to his own gas, the extraction plant would not pay because its own supply would be blown away in a year. It was avowed that competition might force the big companies to put up stripping plants, which would result in dissipating the entire giant

²⁹*Final Report on Utility Corporations, 98-99.*

³⁰Cheek, 278.

³¹*Final Report on Utility Corporations, 98-99.*

³²*Ibid.*, 94-95.

³³*Ibid.*, 99.

field in a single year.³⁴ The large firms denied that ratable taking would please the strippers, charging that the real purpose of the extraction plants was to compel the payment of high prices for gas in order to protect the huge pipe line investments. Since they owned 80 per cent of the "sweet" gas, the pipe lines asserted they could not afford to buy from the other owners.³⁵ Attention was called to one plant which stripped the gas of eight wells. That plant extracted gasoline and then released nearly 23 billion cubic feet of gas in eight months of 1934. A pipe line owner vowed that this plant was taking gas from his wells 15 miles away.³⁶

In addition to official appeals at hearings on the situation, the pipe line concerns sought the assistance of the public. The Dallas Natural Resource Committee and the Panhandle Conservation Association were organized and directed to arouse the voters. In general these organizations fought the stripping plants with two arguments. First, the natural gas should be saved to supply the public need, thereby preventing a return of the coal scuttle. Second, the great loss of energy and its commercial value were stressed. The two publicity organizations used the radio, the postal service, and newspapers in their campaign. Even the assistance of women's clubs was sought.

In reply, the independent owners of the stripping plants agreed that economic grounds alone would not justify the use of the extraction process. They agreed, however, that it was the only way the Texas legislature had found for protecting the small operators from gross abuse. Three times in court the big firms had invalidated the efforts of state officials to solve the problem of correlative rights. The owners of the unconnected wells had appeared to be doomed to lose their gas and gain no revenue while the pressure in their wells fell and they were denied any market whatsoever. The act of the legislature which permitted the erection of stripping plants had impressed the pipe line companies with the value of conservation, but they remained unwilling to agree to the ratable taking of the gas. The small firms contended that at the existing rate of withdrawal, the Panhandle field would produce for 35 years, a period which could be extended to 175 years by restricting the gas for use only as light and fuel.³⁷

While there was great discord on the manner and means of ad-

³⁴*Hearings*, H. R. 441, 2247-2251.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 2257-2266.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 2271-2274, 2280-2281.

³⁷Twenty-one daily newspapers carried advertising in this campaign. *Natural Gas* (Cincinnati) November, 1934, XV, No. 11, 31; *Hearings*, H. R. 441, 2209-2224.

justing the correlative rights in 1934, there was hearty agreement that the waste was outrageous. At the existing prices, the stripping plants were expending 94 cents worth of gas to gain gasoline worth six cents. In the acquisition of \$10,000 from gasoline, natural gas worth \$170,000 was blown away.³⁸ In 1934 the waste was 483,000,000,000 cubic feet, an increase of 76 per cent above the previous year. There were 42 gasoline extraction plants and 25 carbon black plants which combined to take two-thirds as much natural gas from the field as did the nine pipe lines. By 1935, 60 per cent of the gas production was considered wasted.³⁹

Despite the futility of previous legislation, the Railroad Commission's authority was increased by another act in 1935.⁴⁰ This law proposed both to prevent waste and to adjust the correlative rights and opportunities of "each owner of gas in a common reservoir to produce and use or sell such gas".⁴¹ The law required "sweet" gas either to be sold or returned to the formation after the extraction of gasoline, prohibiting the previous method of blowing it into the air.

After gaining the views and suggestions of the conflicting interests at formal hearings, the Railroad Commission issued operational rules in August under the new law. Since most factions in the conflict were antagonized by the new regulations, a veritable rash of injunctions endeavored to prevent enforcement.⁴² The stripping plant owners objected to pumping the treated gas back into the earth, while the pipe line chiefs resisted the allocation of production.⁴³ While those cases were argued in the courts, the rate of waste fell nearly one-half.⁴⁴

The significant feature of the new law was the authority given the Railroad Commission to "adjust correlative rights and opportunities, a legal aspect recognized, as stated before, as early as 1900 by the Supreme Court of the United States."⁴⁵ In this Texas instance, however, the large companies argued that the regulations were designed to force them to buy the gas of the independent producers and not, as the state contended, to prevent waste. The suit of the Consolidated Gas Utilities Company, one of the large firms, was heard initially in a Federal court, thereby avoiding a state

³⁸*Natural Gas*, March, 1934, XV, No. 3, 34.

³⁹*Ibid.*, February, 1935, XVI, No. 2, 11.

⁴⁰44th Texas Legislature, *Acts of 1935*, House Bill 266; Cheek, 280-281.

⁴¹Summers, Chapter 28, Sec. 941, 465-466.

⁴²*Final Report on Utility Corporations*, 100.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 100-101.

⁴⁴United States Geological Survey, *Minerals Yearbook*, 1936, 741.

⁴⁵*Ohio Oil Company vs. Indiana*, 177 U. S. 190, 44 L. Ed. 729.

court interpretation of the law. The Railroad Commission appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the absence of a state court construction of the statute, the Supreme Court refused to interpret the act. It agreed, however, that a law designed to coerce the purchase of gas from competitive producers would be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court believed that the Railroad Commission had the correct interpretation, and was certain that the landowner was entitled to the natural gas beneath his property. Except for two considerations, the orders of the Railroad Commission prorating the production of gas would have been held invalid. Save for protecting correlative rights and preventing waste, the Railroad Commission's rules amounted to taking private property for private benefit.⁴⁶ Thus, somewhat indirectly, the Supreme Court of the United States supported the Texas legislature's efforts to solve the problem of correlative rights in the Panhandle gas field.

While the Supreme Court's opinion was only a partial substantiation of the Railroad Commission's rules, it sufficed to discourage further litigation since it recognized correlative rights. With the prohibition of venting by the extraction plants and the proration of production, most of the independent wells found pipe line outlets. Attorneys did not agree exactly on the direct effect of the decision, although the opinion was regarded as granting the power to prorate production for the prevention of draining gas from one property to another. In the *Corzelius* Case in 1945 the Supreme Court of Texas upheld the authority of the Railroad Commission to adjust correlative rights as an obligation to treat all parties justly.⁴⁷ Considered together, the decisions in the Consolidated and the *Corzelius* cases definitely recognized and accepted the power of a state to control the production of natural gas in the protection of correlative rights.

In the evolution of the legality of correlative rights, more than 18 chaotic years had elapsed in the Panhandle, the world's largest natural gas reservoir. In the leasing period after the discovery, the fabulous national resource became the property of hundreds of individuals and companies. The intense economic warfare, based on unequal financial and marketing resources, passed through two phases before it was stopped. Under the Texas statute of 1925 the large firms owning pipe lines were the masters of the field. The little companies wanted to sell their gas, but the big firms with their

⁴⁶*Thompson vs. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation*, 300 U. S. 55.

⁴⁷*Corzelius vs. Harrell*, 186 S. W. (2d Series) 961; Maurice Cheek to Gerald Forbes, March 1, 1946.

own wells would neither buy voluntarily nor could they legally be forced to do so. Then in 1933 the small concerns were permitted to gain a modicum of revenue by extracting natural gasoline, thereby developing a monumental waste, which would have exhausted the field in a short period. Foreseeing the end of the natural gas, the big companies fought the extracting plants, while those interests denounced the pipe lines. Neither group was winning the battle, while one of the nation's valuable basic resources was being blown away. Then, in 1935, another Texas law took all interests into account and gave the Railroad Commission regulatory authority under correlative rights. The courts, both directly and indirectly, upheld that law and the Panhandle natural gas waste was curbed rapidly.

Written Farm Leases in Texas

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Good arrangements between landlords and tenants, set down in written form, are not the general rule in Texas. The number in use is much smaller than in several other states. Written leases appear to be the rule only on farms rented by Farmers Home Administration clients, on those owned by lending agencies, such as insurance companies, and on some of the larger farms and ranches.

The fact that relatively few good written contracts are used is not due to lack of effort of agricultural agencies. For many years, A. & M. College of Texas has been doing work on farm leases. Part of this effort has been incidental to research primarily on farm management and on the broader aspects of land tenure. Some has been specifically on leases. The latter effort has included the preparation of several good lease forms adapted for use in renting land for raising specific crops or livestock. One or two extension specialists have for years devoted some attention to farm leases. The farm papers of the state have constantly advocated use of good written lease forms. Numerous other agricultural agencies have given their endorsement to efforts looking toward general use of good written farm leases.

Two years ago, numerous requests were received by the college for assistance on farm leasing problems. Some came from business and professional men who had acquired farms and ranches during the war and wanted model forms because they were accustomed, as a matter of routine, to using written contracts in business matters. Others came from officers of agricultural agencies working in the conservation field who had found their efforts largely mitigated on tenant-operated farms. Still others came from landlords and tenants, generally, who were confused by the wide variations in rental rates and arrangements that were developing in the abnormal situation of the war period and who sought information on rational rental practices.

The college agricultural council appointed a committee¹ in August, 1945, to formulate a farm lease that might be acceptable

¹The committee consisted of J. Wheeler Barger, Head, Department of Agricultural Economics, School of Agriculture; L. P. Gabbard, Chief, Division of Farm and Ranch Economics, Agricultural Experiment Station; and J. L. Matthews, Assistant in Agricultural Planning, Texas Extension Service.

to landlords and tenants. The committee immediately sought the co-operation of leaders from other agricultural agencies. The product of the collective effort embodied in Extension Service Publication No. B-144, dated July, 1946, is entitled, "General Farm Lease Form with Suggestions for Its Use." The *Farmer-Stockman* ran the entire publication in the August, 1946, issue and many thousands of copies of reprints were supplied to persons in this and other states. The work was ably discussed in four articles by Mr. Eugene Butler in the *Progressive-Farmer* and also referred to in editorials by Mr. Frank Briggs in *Farm and Ranch*. The agricultural department of the Second National Bank of Houston has printed twenty thousand copies for distribution to country bankers and others. The widespread interest and response to the lease form suggests that a start has been made in developing something useful. What the committee attempted to do in the development of this farm lease may be outlined as follows:

First, it sought to prepare a general form that could be used for any type of enterprise or any combination of enterprises in any type of farming area in Texas or anywhere else. It was convinced that forms for use in connection with one enterprise may be used only in a limited number of situations. For every instance in which a special contract is needed for raising alfalfa, beef cattle or cotton, hundreds of contracts are needed covering two, three, or even more crops and possibly also one or two livestock enterprises—in other words, a desirable combination of enterprises and a proper balance suited to the particular farm. While special forms are useful in many instances, a lease form of general application has obvious advantages.

Second, the committee sought to make available a leasing form that would not require the services of a stenographer and/or an attorney. Many of the model leases heretofore offered the landlord and tenant are contained in bulletins. Numerous paragraphs are presented from which selections may be made. In other instances, the desirable provisions for leases are merely discussed, leaving the actual phraseology to be worked out. In either of these cases, the services of a typist are required and frequently also those of an attorney. The average landlord and tenant will not go to the trouble and expense of having a lease drafted and copied. Having made available in duplicate a lease that can be used in its existing form merely by checking or filling in terms, more landlords and tenants will use it.

Third, the committee sought to cover in the lease form every major question that might arise between landlords and tenants in their relationship, so that attention may thus be called to these

questions and agreement reached on them at the outset. In some cases, this was done by listing the alternate proposals from which a selection might be made; in others, by giving the heading and leaving blank spaces in which appropriate data might be entered. Thus, upon completion, the committee hoped the agreement would cover all major questions.

Fourth, the committee endeavored to write the lease in language readily understandable to the average landlord and tenant. Many people appear to think that an agreement is not legally enforceable unless written in terms that only an attorney can understand. The fact is that a court will as readily enforce a contract expressed in simple, everyday language, provided the intent of the parties is made clear. While the committee believes the lease form submitted is legally valid, it frankly is not too greatly concerned about that point. The principal concern is not to produce something useful in court, but rather something to keep people out of court. That purpose can best be served by having the parties reach a common understanding at the beginning and by having that understanding stated in clear and simple language.

Fifth, the committee tried to give specific attention and emphasis to conservation practices in the lease form. Lack of attention to conservation, it is generally agreed, is among the greatest evils of farm tenancy. Rented farms often can be identified by the worn out soil and the "run-down" buildings. The lease form gives more than usual attention to this question. Instead of merely reciting such usual and indefinite phrases as "the tenant agrees to employ good husbandry," or "the tenant agrees not to suffer any waste to be committed on the farm," the committee offered suggestions and provided space to set forth a specific program of conservation to be followed, with the obligations of both the landlord and the tenant definitely assigned.

One feature of the conservation aspects of the lease agreement is a proposed clause binding the tenant to carry out the recommended conservation plan if a farm is "covered" by a contract between the landlord and the Soil Conservation District. Another section affords space for listing the approved Production and Marketing Administration practices that are to be carried out on the place, specifying what the landlord and tenant each is to contribute, and how the money, subject to "P.M.A." approval, is to be divided between them. Still another place furnishes space for listing other improved farming practices, for which no "P.M.A." assistance is available. Other things related to conservation which are covered in the lease form are the maintenance of existing conservation structures, the making of major and minor improvements and re-

pairs, the removal of fixtures constructed by the tenant, and the compensation to the tenant for the unexhausted value of his contributions to any improvements on the land. These features, it is hoped, will contribute definitely toward the inclusion of conservation practices on leased farms of the state.

Our last general objective was to summarize the more common rental rates and arrangements in the production of various crops and types and classes of livestock. Such information is urgently sought. Numerous requests have come to the college for information on what the landlord contributes, other than land, and what he receives; and, conversely, on what the tenant does and what he receives from various crop or livestock enterprises. The committee secured and summarized the requested information, but it does not rely on custom as the best measure of equity in rental arrangement. A more precise and equitable method is to calculate the value of the contribution that each party makes, taking into account the productivity of the particular land and type of improvements, along with other factors. By listing the items of investment and farm operating cost and by assigning values to them, the relative importance of the contribution of each party can be fairly well estimated. This system, however, might prove too complicated to win general acceptance. The advisory committee recommended its omission.

Nearly everybody agrees that good written farm leases are preferable to oral agreements. As has been said, the primary advantage of written leases is not altogether in providing documentary evidence in court when litigation arises, but rather in preventing disagreements and avoiding the necessity of formal litigation. Most disputes between landlords and tenants result from their failure to have a definite understanding on all important matters at the outset, or from their later misunderstanding of what was originally agreed upon. A good written lease leads the parties to settle all important questions at the beginning. A written lease serves as a record of these agreements in case questions later arise. Prior to 1942, about one-third of all tenants moved every year. Such instability, a "tragedy" not only for landlords and tenants but also for the general public, results in expense of moving, unsatisfactory farm organization, social instability, and inattention to sound conservation practices. A part of this instability is due to lack of harmonious relationships between landlord and tenant. Written leases, by lessening misunderstandings, contribute to longer tenure. Certainly long-term occupation should be encouraged. Good systems of farming require long-time planning. If each party has confidence in the other at the outset, the term

usually should be for a longer period than one year. In other instances, the agreement should be for one year, with the agreement automatically renewing for the following year, unless either party gives notice of its termination well in advance. Such provisions contribute to stability.

The mere fact that a lease is in writing is no assurance that it is a good one. Some written leases are definitely unfair, enabling one party to take advantage of the other. Perhaps that is one reason for some suspicion of them. Certainly a good oral agreement is much better than a poor written one. Furthermore, the mere fact that a written lease is used is no guaranty that a good situation is thus created for the landlord, the tenant, and the farm. It gives no assurance the soil is sufficiently productive; the farm business is sufficiently large, or the farm management program is adequate to produce a reasonable living for the tenant family; further, a written lease does not assure that both parties will be reasonable, cooperative, fair and pleasant in their relationships. Written leases, in short, do not by any means solve all problems of tenure; but good ones contribute materially in that direction.

The committee considers the General Farm Lease Form as only a beginning. It needs testing in practical use. It, no doubt, needs revisions. It needs, perhaps, to be superseded by another, using an entirely different approach. Periodic revisions, as experience indicates the need for changes or new provisions, are to be published.

Even if the present lease form were perfect, it would not solve all the problems of leasing. Perhaps the greater task still remains—that of conducting an effective program of education to secure the adoption and use of the lease. Improvement in leasing practices will not be made by any other means. The suggestion is sometimes made that a law establishing desirable rental arrangements such as exists in England would accomplish the desired results. But we cannot in this country secure overnight by legislation what it has taken England several centuries to accomplish by evolutionary means. We do not need to devote centuries, however, to educating landlords and tenants in Texas on the importance of using good written contracts. Positive support by all agricultural workers of the various agencies in a sound educational program on good written leases would probably effect substantial progress in their use within a relatively few years.

Conservatism: A Definition

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In the arena of social and political conflict there is a clash of attitudes as well as of interests. Believers in economic determinism will argue that the two can never be separated, even for purposes of discussion, and that men's attitudes, opinions, and convictions are reflections of their material interests. Even were we to assume, however, that this view is correct, we would still have to reckon with those very attitudes which economic factors had already produced. The connection between men's ideas and their material environment is no simple, casual one, but a complex, reciprocal relationship. Ideas develop independently, apart from the conditions which originally bring them into being, and are acted upon by men who never thought to gain from their adoption. One whose political ideas were conditioned by the possession of great wealth will be likely to retain those ideas even though his circumstances are reduced.

Artists will give us different paintings of the same subject, and the study of social problems leads men to quite different conclusions. Indeed, it is this very dependence on perspective which produces all debate.¹ Perspective usually consists of a reliance on inherited or acquired attitudes rather than on logical thinking. This is the source of futile complaints by those who compare unfavorably the techniques of social studies with those of natural sciences. It is, of course, unfortunate that social views should be founded upon prejudice, misinformation, fragmentary knowledge, and dishonest types of propaganda. There are remedies for these particular evils. Men may become more critical, more inquiring, more tolerant, more open-minded. But there will still be a complaint directed at reliance upon instinct, as Lord Hugh Cecil calls it, "natural instinct".² Men will not rely upon logical processes only. Indeed, the very masters of formal logic disagree on fundamental social values and political aims.

The study of ideas in conflict takes on special significance during an era of political ferment in a free society. There the mass of men can eventually put into effect the ideas they come to hold; there political evolution goes on at a quicker pace; and there it is

¹See Edward M. Salt, *Political Institutions: A Preface* (1938), p. 3.

²*Natural Instinct: The Basis of Social Institutions* (1926)

more influenced by mass emotions. Change is the outstanding characteristic of modern society,³ and since it can mean at least as much for evil as for good, the conservatives perform a valuable social function in opposing a too hasty innovation, in interesting themselves more in preservation than in change, and by attempting to edit and censor proposed reforms.⁴

No single phrase or paragraph can define, much less explain, conservatism. There are many shades of conservatism, and as many definitions are required to clarify the meanings of this term. To be sure, there is a certain universal sense to conservatism,⁵ but more important are its many national aspects, for each people has its own conservatism, traditions, deeply rooted institutions, and way of maintaining historical continuity with its own past. The sum of these factors is the social form and organization of the community, the cake of custom, as Bagehot so aptly terms it.⁶

The several types of conservatism are found in many variations in degree and intensity. Intellect and emotion combine to produce conservatism, as they do any other political creed, and the proportions in which they combine differ from one individual to another. The distinction between these two influences is difficult to draw, for thought and feeling are separated by no clear boundary. Hardly any one would argue that he had achieved a complete separation of the two as they worked on his own mind.

Feeling is linked to sentiment, emotion, habit and instinct. While it is a mental attribute, it belongs to the emotional side of the mind rather than to the intellective. Woodworth states that "feeling is subjective and unanalyzed"; it is an "undercurrent" or "background" of consciousness.⁷ "Discarding figurative expressions," writes Wolfe, "we may regard feeling as a quiescent organic state in which there is going on no special organic preparation for, or effort in, activity, and no consciousness either of well-being or ill-

³"...the invention of invention made change, instead of stability, the supreme characteristic of the social scene." Harold Laski, *The Rise of Liberalism* (1936) p. 4.

⁴These negative functions of conservatism do not exclude innovating and reformist tendencies. The history of the British Conservative party is in no small part the history of Tory Reform. See Maurice Woods, *A History of the Tory Party* (London, 1924).

⁵"All great peoples are conservative; slow to believe in novelties; patient of much error in actualities; deeply and forever certain of the greatness that is in law, in custom once solemnly established, and now long recognized as just and final." Thomas Carlyle, *Past and Present*, (London, 1843), Ch. III.

⁶*Physics and Politics* (London, 1873), Ch. I.

⁷*Psychology, a Study of Mental Life* (1921), p. 172.

being".⁸ Feeling in this sense is the "datum level from which 'the feelings' and emotions rise and fall, like waves and tides on the sea."⁹

Emotion is related to feeling, but is distinguished from it in degree and complexity. Emotions may be regarded as relatively slight departures from the mean level of feeling, being pent-up or highly concentrated expressions of feeling that have been suddenly released. This interpretation derives from the James-Lange theory of the emotions as a "blend of organic sensations,"¹⁰ a "sudden complex of bodily sensations arising from our instinctive reactions toward appropriate stimuli."¹¹ These technical distinctions are of greater interest to the psychologist than to political scientists. For us it is sufficient to regard an emotion as a differential feeling, above or below the datum level, or, more simply still, as a vibration of the personality. Feeling and emotion are basic influences in all political struggles; and no one, however much he may strive to loosen their grip, can totally escape their effect.

II

Conservatism may be natural or acquired, personal, professional, or political, religious or literary, universal or national, local or regional, Occidental or Oriental, American or European, English or Continental. We are concerned with more than one, but not with all, of these forms of conservatism.

Natural conservatism is both the result of habit and the product of fear. Thus it is the psychological basis of all other conservatism. Many kinds of fear are present in conservatism. Wolfe lists fear of the unknown, fear of the unfamiliar, fear of the unconventional, fear of social ostracism. While distinguishing between the two kinds of conservatism, interested and disinterested, he states that "all conservatism . . . is essentially a safety-first attitude."¹² Habit is only less important than fear in the making of conservatism. Some would argue that it could not be distinguished from fear; for it is fear of the results of breaking established usages and habits that normally ensures their observance.

⁸*Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method* (1923), p. 7.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹¹Z. C. Dickinson, *Economic Motives, a Study in the Psychological Foundations of Economic Theory* (1922), p. 132.

¹²Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

To William James habit appeared as the chief conservative force in society:¹³

"When we look at living creatures from an outward point of view, one of the first things that strikes us is that they are bundles of habits. . . . It thus appears that habit covers a very large part of life, and that one engaged in studying the objective manifestations of mind is bound at the very outset to define clearly just what its limits are. . . . Habit is thus the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings."

Since conservatism is a combination of fear and habit, it would seem to be a natural tendency of the human mind. Lord Hugh Cecil has so described it:¹⁴

"It is a disposition averse from change; and it springs partly from a distrust of the unknown and corresponding reliance on experience rather than on theoretic reasoning; partly from a faculty in men to adapt themselves to their surroundings so that what is familiar merely because of its familiarity becomes more acceptable or more tolerable than what is unfamiliar."

An almost universal conservative sentiment finds expression in the proverbs: "Look before you leap," "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," "An ounce of fact is worth a pound of theory." Too much is perhaps assumed in stating that conservatism is a natural attribute of man. But fear of change seems always to have existed; and there is a respectable tradition that human nature is fixed. Not that there is no flux, but there is more constancy. Santayana writes:¹⁵

"A conception of something called human nature arises not unnaturally on observing the passions of men, passions which under various disguises seem to reappear in all ages and countries."

Political conservatism is a fusion of either natural or acquired conservatism with politics. A man may be a conservative in politics because he is of conservative temperament. His natural conservatism inclines him to political conservatism. But he may be inclined otherwise, he may like new things and new ideas, and still be a political conservative. His political ideas in this case are acquired, for observation, study or interest have overcome normal

¹³Habit (Reprinted from *The Principles of Psychology*) (1914), pp. 1; 51.

¹⁴*Conservatism* (London, 1912), p. 9.

¹⁵*The Life of Reason or the Phases of Human Progress* (Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1921), p. 269.

leanings. One may, on the other hand, be progressive or radical in politics, and be conservative in dress, manners, theology, literary or artistic preferences.

Local conservatism may be shared by those who are otherwise radical or progressive in politics. President Roosevelt was far more of a progressive than a conservative. Yet while Governor of New York State he displayed more than a little sympathy for tradition in his attitude toward county government reform. Alfred E. Smith had proposed that superfluous county governments be eliminated and the functions of others be combined. Many thought the existence of five separate county governments to be unnecessary, wasteful and conducive to political corruption. It seemed also that many of the up-State counties could be abolished without loss of efficiency and with considerable saving to the taxpayers. Discussing the subject shortly after he became Governor, however, he declared that Al Smith had "slipped up" in this one particular. After calling the latter's plan "a grand little theory," he added, "but I hope that it will be some time before Dutchess County is willing to give up its identity. We have historic counties in New York State and we are mighty proud of them."¹⁶

Political conservatism is a rationalization and defense of a traditional social and political order. Conservatism will therefore reflect the different social orders which give rise to it. That of England or Holland will differ from that of France or Switzerland. European conservatism differs from that of China and India. Conservatism in the United States is different from conservatism elsewhere. Yet it has much in common with the conservatism of all free states and with English toryism in particular.

To the conservative it appears that the world has of late changed greatly without improving. For him there has been much furor, but no progress toward a better order of things. He attempts, therefore, to fight off the efforts of reformers who would scrap or greatly modify the present system. He does this for either or both of two reasons. He fears that adoption of novel remedies will injure his position in society or that it will destroy the liberties which he wishes to see preserved. He believes that socialism will not work successfully in an environment of freedom. He therefore rejects it. For he prefers freedom to equality when it appears, as it does to him, that the two are incompatible. Moreover, he is disturbed by the radical's unwillingness to look for guidance to a past which he himself cherishes.

¹⁶Speech at Syracuse, New York, February 2, 1929. Cited by Mauritz A. Hallgren, *The Gay Reformer* (1935), p. 31.

Conservatism, however, is not a standpat and diehard defense of a do nothing economic policy. True conservatism is not a form of political paralysis. It is a predisposition in favor of the past rather than an irrevocable commitment to it. It is discernment in change rather than frustrated reaction. Political definitions are designations of degree, not of kind, and lack meaning except as they are related to each other. This relativity must be emphasized. Indeed, the conservatism of one people may well be the radicalism of another.¹⁷ Ambrose Bierce defined radicalism as the conservatism of tomorrow injected into the affairs of today.¹⁸ It is sometimes said that the conservative of today worships the radical of yesterday. This merely points up the relativity of political creeds. It shows the tendency of all institutions and arrangements, however abruptly conceived and hastily adopted, to become identified with a traditional order which conservatives defend.

Practices and institutions once frowned upon because of their novelty come eventually to be accepted as workable and respectable. Here is the triumph of habit. Here is a demonstration of man's essential conservatism. Here is proof that he is no creature who desires to engage in the pursuit of ceaseless change. Even the most radical of men, after achieving their reforms, want to settle down and grow accustomed to the changes they have wrought.¹⁹ There is a tendency to preserve and consolidate reforms, so that the passage of time renders conservative and respectable what was formerly radical or even revolutionary.

Innovations are at first accepted reluctantly; their opponents gradually become used to them; and, finally, through influence of habit, become so accustomed to their spirit and operation that they wish to conserve them. This is a process of innovation, reluctant acceptance of a *fait accompli*, gradual adaptation, complete habit-

¹⁷In the United States conservative groups have long favored "rugged individualism", while in Great Britain the Tory party is at least as advanced as the New Deal in the amount of state enterprise which it has sponsored. British conservatives are puzzled by the bitter opposition in the United States to forms of legislation which have been long accepted by all groups in the British Isles. "If the doctrines of the old economists no longer serve for the purposes of our society," said Winston Churchill, "they must be replaced by a new body of doctrine equally well-related in itself, and equally well-fitting into a general theme." *Parliamentary Government and the Economic Problem* (The Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 1930), p. 12.

¹⁸*The Devil's Dictionary* (1911), p. 54.

¹⁹This is emphasized by the way in which revolutionary leadership invariably gives way to reaction. See Raymond G. Gettell, *History of Political Thought* (1924), pp. 329-32; C. A. Beard, *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913); C. M. Walsh, *Political Science of John Adams* (1915).

uation, all adding up to—conservatism. Completion of this cycle leaves both the radicals who inaugurated the reforms and the conservatives who opposed them now agreed on their preservation. The former radical may now be conservative when others suggest further changes, even though they be in the direction taken by his original reforms. It was said of the English Whigs that they had no sympathy for any revolution but their own. This particular habit of mind is not confined to the English Whigs. The history of all revolutionary epochs is replete with the examples of revolutionaries turned conservative.²⁰

It is no adverse criticism of modern conservatives, however, to say that their ideas were once considered radical, or that the doctrines they oppose may some day be thought conservative. Rather, it is a kind of compliment, being an admission from the most unlikely source that conservatives do change, as indeed they must. However, it proves that conservatism also is not enough. Were it otherwise, yesterday's radicals would be buried in the confusion of their own making and forgotten, not "worshipped" by conservatives today. Conservatives cannot refute this by saying that the reformers only did in haste what they themselves would have done eventually. For history is strewn with the wreckage of societies in which change did not come rapidly enough to avert revolution and disaster.

This does not lessen the importance of the function served by conservatism. More often than is commonly appreciated, conservatives do anticipate the need for reform.²¹ An enlightened conservatism will have no need to make pilgrimages to the tombs of departed radicals. Conservatives, however, reveal no inconsistency or inadequacy in supporting measures and policies which had their origins in the radicalism of another day. The conservatives of a past era performed a socially useful task in opposing radicalism that was new born. Their purpose was not to prevent change, but to modify the manner in which it was effected. That they appeared

²⁰"John Adams, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of revolutionary ideas in the earlier period, was much influenced by the course of events in America, and became a vigorous advocate of strong government and of aristocratic principles." Gettell, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

²¹To anticipate reform was the aim of Tory Democracy in England. Its central proposition was "that the Conservative Party was willing and thoroughly competent to deal with the needs of democracy, and the multiplying problems of modern life; and that the British Constitution, so far from being incompatible with the social progress of the great mass of the people was in itself a flexible instrument by which that progress might be guided and secured." Winston Churchill, *Life of Lord Randolph Churchill*, (Vol. I, 1906), p. 293.

to struggle senselessly to preserve the *status quo* should not obscure the fact that by their very opposition they caused the reformers to advance more cautiously than they would otherwise have done.

Here conservatism suffers a serious disadvantage. However reckless a radical may be, he is usually able to point to some real defect in the social order, and by agitation succeed in effecting a degree of reform. His accomplishment is definite—measurably so. Since he is always on the offensive, his forward movement is marked by tangible gain. His recklessness is soon forgotten in the general satisfaction aroused by whatever practical reforms he secures.

The conservative, on the other hand, is almost always on the defensive. If he must do something, he surrenders the old, if not gracefully, then grudgingly. He sometimes adopts a policy of negotiations in the hope that by viewing with alarm he may make reformers advance more slowly. The credit which he receives for his efforts is in inverse proportion to their success. For the measures of his opponents are made more workable and less dangerous according as they heed his alarms and denunciations. Measures of precaution are never justly appreciated, because when most effectual they are never seen to be necessary. The conservative by his very admonitions destroys the likelihood of his fears being realized. He is subsequently ridiculed for what seem to have been foolish fears.

Even when they accomplish little of a positive character, conservatives prevent immeasurable harm. For enormous chaos would result were radicals to have it entirely their own way, were they left at any time of crisis to do as they pleased, were no one present to view with alarm. Hence, while it is not always constructive, conservatism is essential to any society undergoing rapid change. Its contributions are no less valuable because negative. In a stable society conservatism needs no pleading.

There is always a predisposition in favor of conservatism. The mass of people are usually averse to change. Majorities are not interested in grandiose schemes for making the world over. Some of the Victorian critics of democracy even went so far as to argue that the overwhelming conservatism of the common man rendered him incapable of self rule.²² If political power were equalized, they

²²Sir Henry Maine, a vigorous critic of democratic aspirations in the latter half of the nineteenth century, seemed to fear the inertia rather than the radicalism of the masses of his time. His beliefs were influenced by his observations in India where "Each individual... is a slave to the customs of the group to which he belongs... The council of village elders does not command any-

said, there would be no progress. Certain Tories, among them Disraeli, defended the Reform Bill of 1867 by asserting a profound trust in the British working man, who could be relied on to vote against the radical reformers.²³

Nor is it surprising that the majority should normally be conservative. Few desire to live in a state of unceasing change. Experiments are not cheap, and the masses of people must eventually share in their cost. No people going about its daily business wishes to have its ways greatly disturbed for light and transient causes. They desire tranquillity above all, and, as Burke put it, peace for them is preferable to truth. Numb to the touch of extreme doctrines, they like the conservative who is something of a progressive and the progressive who is something of a conservative, preferring the intelligent moderates to the merely clever extremists who may catch their fleeting fancy but never their permanent trust.

As men retreat from extreme positions, and drift toward the center, they become conservatives or progressives of a moderate type, between whom it is sometimes even difficult to distinguish. This is not to say that no sincere differences divide the two groups occupying the center; they remain consciously conservative or consciously progressive. The one group believes the government to be in safest hands when left-wing Tories are in office; the other when right-wing liberals are in power. Each side, however, will respect the other; for each center group realizes that there is something higher than party, and for that reason feels itself more closely allied with the moderates in the opposition camp than with the extremists in its own. Therefore, neither will feel unassured when the other is in power, for they will have agreed upon the essentials of a constitutional order, thus achieving the very condition and actual promise of a free society.

thing, it merely declares what has been. Nor does it generally declare that which it believes some higher power to have commanded; those most entitled to speak on the subject deny that the natives of India necessarily require divine or political authority as the basis of their usages; their antiquity is by itself assumed to be a sufficient reason for obeying them." *Village Communities in the East and West* (London, 1880), p. 13-14; 68. What Maine saw in India confirmed a general thesis. "It is indisputable," he wrote, "that much the greatest part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by embodiment in some permanent record." *Ancient Law* (Third American from Fifth London ed., 1883), pp. 22-23.

²³See Andre Maurois, *Disraeli: A Picture of the Victorian Age* (1928), pp. 240-43.

Book Reviews

Edited by H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

Ernest Cassirer: *The Myth of the State*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, pp. xii, 303. \$3.75.)

Professor Cassirer has written in this volume a brief history of political theory that is excellent in style and fresh in its approach. It is a magnificent book wholly aside from the issue of myth in modern political life. But the reason for writing such a history of ideas is to show that political theory at its best has been a struggle against the force of myth. Yet political writers have often come close to the demonic, the anti-intellectual, and the irrational in their explanations of the state and in their defenses of values. And the peculiarity of recent times has been the perversion of theorists who left loop-holes for the subsequent misuse of their own ideas. For in our day there has been a new revival of the demonic and the irrational, and what is more striking one can observe original techniques in the use of language, symbol and ritual in order to attain political support and to destroy the independence of mind of civilized man. Cassirer concludes that, however distasteful the idea may be, culture is weaker and thinner than we thought and that men can easily be turned from reality to myth. The techniques of the totalitarian state are the perversion of a whole intellectual past.

Cassirer denies that myth is mere primitivism, associated with the childhood of humanity, as some writers have contended; nor does it contain any logic, granting the proper assumptions, as others have held. Myth is grounded on psychological fact; it is the expression of emotional force in human nature through symbolic form, and the revolution in political technique has given the symbols of that expression. Language, as in Germany, was altered, and every follower had to learn the new meanings and uses of old words. Latent ideas have been pulled to the foreground in the revision of past thinkers in order to give a species of scholarly justification. Carlyle's activism and hero-worship can be developed into the cult of the *fuehrer*, just as Gobineau's speculations can emerge in a new political program, or Hegel's philosophy of history can be perverted for ideological use. But all such devices have overthrown in modern times the Greek and Roman effort to create a legal state, the medieval effort to limit power by creating a moral state, or the modern struggle for constitutionalism.

While we might all agree in Cassirer's treatment of the extreme form of myth represented in National Socialism, and with his

fresh perceptiveness in discussing the history of political ideas, he is not succinct on one problem. There is a point where intelligence ends and myth begins; it is this question that concerns most of us in our political appreciations rather than the extreme form of myth to be found in the modern tyranny. Now most of us also would concede that this dividing point between myth and reality is determined by our central philosophy of living. For a democrat this dividing line is certainly of crucial importance, for he might ask if any part of democracy is myth, if any part is irrational, or if any of it is simply a symbolic expression of unintelligent psychological forces. Some would say that all religion is myth, but most of us would not. Cassirer's book thus leaves unanswered the questions that any perceptive citizen of our democracy might ask.

University of Illinois

Francis G. Wilson

Howard W. Odum. *The Way of the South*. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947, pp. 350. \$3.00.)

Vivid emotion and surgical objectivity have both been well represented in the hosts of books and pamphlets which have tried to explain the problem of the southern region within the past decades. Here is an interesting volume which combines both.

The South has been preached at, ridiculed, cajoled, threatened, defended, dissected and analyzed from various points of view by numerous writers with varied points of view. It seems almost as difficult to answer the question "Is it true what they say about Dixie?" as it is to uncover the truth about Russia—and for the same reason. What has been written has been either so partisan as to be one-sided, or has been so heavily statisticoid as to be nearly meaningless. Here is a study which is written by a man who loves the region so deeply that he has devoted most of his life to its study and description but who does not shrink from admitting the truth of many of the unpleasant things that have been said—and has even added a few mortifying truths to the list—, and a man whose scholarship is so recognized that he may give the results of statistical findings without accompanying them with supporting tables. His record gives him the right to speak authoritatively about things southern. This volume demonstrates his willingness to speak without prejudice.

The Way of the South is part and parcel of its author's attempt to portray the region in terms which will aid understanding by southerners of the area in which they live and which will show the interdependence of the regions of the nation. It is one more in a series of pleas that a new regionalism be substituted for the older

sectionalism so that the south and the nation may both benefit.

By way of explanation, the history and cultural conditioning of the south is recapitulated in chapters dealing with the plantation, the Negro, the Caucasian classes, and the religion and politics and education and folklore and the rest of the culture through which they express themselves and which makes of them what they are. Here it is that the book displays a mixture of prose and poetry, of fact and of fiction, consciously used, which may be disturbing to some readers. Here it is, also, that professional Southerners will find much to their liking; and more which will be galling.

But it is in the chapter on the rising distrust of the North and the South for each other after the promise of the earlier decades of the century, the intemperant accusations and the demands and threats that one is led to wonder whether the problems may not be, for all the work of all the Odums, beyond solution. But again, immediately, there comes a plan for planning, for cooperative effort and mutual understanding which not only points to the possibility of solution but which also persuades of its feasibility.

If the politicians and the industrialists, the statesmen and the demagogues would read and ponder this little volume they would at least have a clearer idea of what the south is like and to what it will respond.

The University of Texas

Harry Estill Moore

Walter W. Wilcox: *The Farmer in the Second World War*. (Iowa State College Press, Ames, Iowa, 1947, pp. 410. \$4.00.)

An important service has been rendered by Dr. Walter W. Wilcox in his book, *The Farmer in the Second World War*, in recording the accomplishments of American farmers, government, distributors, farm organizations, and nature toward meeting the unprecedented food needs of the world during and immediately following the Second World War. This was obviously an arduous and often tedious task. The economic experiences of these eventful years will be studied long after that of the physical conflict is relegated to thrilling but less significant pages in history.

The material is well organized and documented. It properly summarizes our experiences in the pre-war depression years when unintentionally we accumulated reserves of food and fibre, which were later to prove a great blessing rather than an embarrassment. Our efforts during the depression had already accustomed agriculture to considerable direction. Quotas and goals were not strangers to the American farmer.

As one would expect, major attention is given to price and re-

lated policies, seven chapters being given to this phase of our war-time experiences. Only occasionally does the author pass judgment on the adequacy of these developments. Most of the remaining chapters are devoted to the work and thinking of farm organizations, the land grant colleges, and the changing character and functions of the United States Department of Agriculture.

For the most part, the author deliberately avoids critical comment, obviously in the interest of historical accuracy. Most personal comments are rather obvious conclusions rather than critical evaluations. For instance, he suggests that action agencies were not well suited to abundance needs, because they had been created for reducing rather than expanding production; that Federal depression programs had not been designed for war emergencies. He occasionally designates as of "major significance" certain acts or occurrences. Not all will agree with some of these rather incidental evaluations. He thinks we did not use wartime opportunities to achieve much needed reallocation of resources which might have saved later serious readjustments.

He endorses the over-all price control program, at the same time pointing out many instances of either complete break down or wrong emphasis in redirecting the use of resources. He suggests "more serious mistakes were made in the livestock and feed programs, than in any other sector of agriculture", and that the Steagall amendment was "the most important single action taken during the war period". He recognizes that many policies were adopted because of political expediency rather than economic need.

In suggesting that the report is less analytical than one might desire, there is danger of misinterpreting its objective. It would add to the satisfaction of many if the work included a chapter giving the author's critical evaluation of policies in view of his recognized ability in this field.

University of Missouri

O. R. Johnson

George Sessions Perry: *Cities of America*. (Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1947, pp. 287. \$3.50.)

In 1945 the *Saturday Evening Post* suggested to George Sessions Perry that he write the profiles of a few of our more important American cities. He began by agreeing to write six, but eventually traveled 40,000 miles and wrote twenty-two city pieces, all or most of which appeared in the *Post*. These profiles have been brought together in book form under the title, *Cities of America*.

The hoarders of the *Post* in which they are to be found may now discard these issues.

With the exception of Mr. Perry's native Rockdale, Texas, the list is composed of some of the better known American cities. They are: New Orleans, New York, Salt Lake City, Baltimore, Dallas-Fort Worth, San Francisco, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Portland (Maine), San Antonio, Cincinnati, Seattle, Boston, Denver, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Madison (Wisconsin), Los Angeles, Kansas City, and Washington.

Mr. Perry's undertaking was a reportorial cross-country tour, and he touched the cities he wrote about only lightly. Whether or not he imparted many facts into his rather colorful descriptions is open to question. There is little doubt but that he erred many times when he writes of San Antonio or Dallas-Fort Worth; but to his readers in Atlanta or Washington, D.C., his story of the former cities might appear definitive and accurate. In other words, there is good reason to believe that the average reader would enjoy what is written about any city other than his own.

Little or nothing is said about the economic, governmental, or political problems of the cities treated. If the profiles have a moral, it seems to be that a city can be as great as it wants to be. Civic self-determinism is possible for all. To summarize, the volume is an assimilation of many times-told local stories gathered from quick impressions and written in a rather contemporary journalistic style.

The University of Texas

Stuart A. MacCorkle

Pitirim A. Sorokin: *Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics*. (New York, Harper & Bros., 1947, pp. xiii, 742, \$5.00.)

This new work by Sorokin is monumental, both in its size and in its significance. The author has set out to "unfold a systematic theory of the structure and dynamics of social, cultural, and personality systems. The book is little concerned with physical, biological, and other 'presociological' problems; instead it confines itself to a study of sociocultural phenomena in their structural and dynamic aspects." (Preface, p. xiii.)

The materials are presented in Seven Parts, with a total subdivision of 48 Chapters. And since the work is intended to "unfold a systematic theory... of systems", the classification of the materials as indicated by the titles given to these seven parts has significance. The Titles are: (1) Sociology: Its Object, Method, and Development; (2) Structural Sociology; (3) Structure of the Social Universe; (4) Social Differentiation and Stratification; (5) Structures of the Cultural and Personality Aspects of the Super-

organic Universe; (6) Dynamics of the Recurrent Social Processes; (7) The Dynamics of Cultural Processes. Parts One and Two are introductory and comprise only three chapters; while twenty chapters are devoted to the elaboration of Parts Six and Seven.

The extent of the discussion and the general make-up of this work make it especially adapted for use as a "Source Book". The 742 pages are 8 inches by 5½ inches in size. Each page is printed in two parallel columns, with the type relatively quite small and close-set. Extensive foot notes are used throughout, and references to many other writers and sources of materials are included in these foot notes.

One may agree or disagree with the author of this work; in fact, one may agree rather with any of the many authors with whom Sorokin so generally takes issue; but in any case the reader will find this book interesting and challenging. For example, one does not have to accept the interpretation expressed in the following quotation to find it thought provoking. "The contemporary sensate system, in its virile stages, contributed markedly to the values of science and technology, the fine arts, and, in lesser degree, philosophy and ethics. But it is clearly approaching the end of its career, indeed, it is rapidly crumbling under our very eyes. In its present decadence phase, characterized by increasing wars and revolutions, by the perversion of science in the interest of ever more lethal weapons of destruction, by progressive sensualism and the like, it has begun to menace the further existence of humanity. If civilization is not to perish, our moribund sensate supersystem must be replaced by a new ideational or idealistic supersystem. Sooner or later such a supersystem will emerge, destined to continue the creative role of the superorganic on this planet." (Page 706.)

The pessimism and dissatisfaction of the author with the "sensate supersystem" and his expressed wish for the return of "a new ideational or idealistic supersystem" may not be so alluring to the reader when he discovers the author saying on pages 631-632: "At the zenith of the sensate supersystem material well-being reaches an exceptionally high level. With the decline of the sensate supersystem this level drops abruptly, often catastrophically, to one of economic misery and even starvation." And again, "Periods dominated by the ideational supersystem tend to create somewhat closed multibonded groups, such as castes and social estates, whereas those dominated by the sensate supersystem favor the more open social classes."

But the author has made a very outstanding contribution to our

sociological literature, and to our sociological thinking. Every student in the field of Sociology will find this a valuable book.

Trinity University

Charles N. Burrows

Hacker and Zahler: *The Shaping of the American Tradition* (Text by Louis M. Hacker. Documents edited by Louis M. Hacker and Helene S. Zahler. Columbia University Press, New York, 1947. pp. xxiv, 1247. \$6:00.)

This volume is by all odds the most comprehensive collection of materials on American institutions that has yet been published. It is almost a library within itself for source material on economics, sociology, history, government and education. Its general theme is the development of American culture.

It is divided into eleven parts whose titles are: I: Leaving Europe and Settling America; II: The First American Revolution; III: Establishing the New Republic; IV: Jacksonian Democracy; V: The Impending Conflict; VI: The Second American Revolution; VII: Growing Pains of the Post-Civil War Decades; VIII: Unrest and Expansion in the Nineties; IX: The New Freedom; X: The Golden Nineteen Twenties; and XI: The Third American Revolution.

Illustrative of the analysis made of the eleven parts, for instance, Part IV, Jacksonian Democracy, contains material on the growth of America, the mercantile economy, leveling tendencies, American expansion, Emerson on nature, Bancroft on the office of the people, De Tocqueville on American democracy, and materials from Hunt, Luther, Morse, Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Benton, and Biddle.

The general introduction is an illuminating account of the development of the American spirit that was finally set in the granite of the American tradition—the unifying force of American life and expressing the fundamental character of our ideals and achievement—the real essence of American civilization.

Fitting into the general introduction and going further into details is a brief analytical text on each part which seeks to give continuity, substance and perspective to the subject matter which the source material cited is intended to illustrate and support. This running interpretation gives life and meaning to the source material and is a very significant departure from previous source books. It does not dull the material for even the expert and makes it much more useful to the immature student. The illustrative material is carefully selected and is thoroughly representative of the best minds of the particular period and subject matter under consideration. This volume will save much time, as well as furnish intelli-

gent direction to students of American life and culture. It is almost a *sine qua non* for the academic desk.

The University of Texas

C. Perry Patterson

Charles Copeland Smith: *The Foreman's Place in Management*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946, pp. xi, 159, \$2.00.)

With the clear-cut purpose of presenting the case of the foreman to executive management, the author of this little book has performed his function admirably. He sets forth succinctly the grouch of the foreman, the causes for the organization of the foremen, and the relative failure of the Foremen's Association of America in enlisting any large portion of the foremen of America. Of course, part of the conditions favorable to the unionization of the foremen has gone with the war, and part has been neutralized to a considerable extent by the National Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. The book still remains, however, required reading for executive management because it outlines so completely the forces and facts relating to the relations between foremen and executive management. Years of contact by the author with both foremen and management have made the book rich in practical illustrations of the problems involved, and his basic solution is for executive management to establish a two-way system of communication with the

Tulane University of Louisiana

Clarence E. Bonnett

foremen. He is frank in advocating employer-sponsored organizations of foremen as well as relating his connection with the National Association of Manufacturers in his work. However, his argument against a collective-bargaining foremen's union could logically be used against rank-and-file unions although he nowhere makes that suggestion.

Leopold Schwarzschild: *The Red Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl Marx*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947, pp. 422, \$4.00.)

There has long been a need for a critical biography of Karl Marx written not from the point of view of one of the factions of the contemporary Marxist movement but by a scholar concerned with the historic facts. Leopold Schwarzschild has written such a book and in doing so has revealed Marx in a new and significant perspective. The stress throughout the book is on the personality of the man, what he thought, what his personal attitude was towards other leaders of the proletarian movement, and how his tactical maneuvers reflected or disguised his own convictions. Unlike Mehring,

Marx's "official" biographer, Schwarzschild does not attempt to make his subject a model of revolutionary consistency or the exponent of a unified doctrine. As a result we see Marx as his contemporaries saw him, arrogant and opinionated, intolerant of criticism, a failure both in his attempt to establish the scientific basis for the inevitability of Socialism and in his ambition to become the political leader of the continental Socialist Parties. Interesting sidelights on Marx's career and personality are brought out, his complete financial irresponsibility, his deep contempt for "the masses", his belief in the necessity of an authoritarian state and the "dictatorship of the proletariat", his complete willingness to adopt any and every expedient and tactic to achieve his ends, and finally his latent anti-semiticism as evidenced in his relationship to Ferdinand Lassalle. Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the author's demonstration of how the basic intolerance of Marx has found expression in the policy of the present day Marxist movement. In short this work goes far towards breaking down the "legend" of Marx and substituting in its place a picture of the man as he really was.

In his task the author has relied heavily upon the collected letters and papers of Marx published under the auspices of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow. These letters and personal papers illustrate the mind of both Marx and Engels on contemporary events and persons and represent the hard core of conviction in relation to which the published tracts of the two men often stand merely as convenient tactical compromises. Throughout the work there runs an ironic comparison between the "brutal repression" directed by the "bourgeois governments" against Marx and his fellow revolutionists, and the actions taken by the "socialist governments" of today against their political opponents. After all the nineteenth century was still the age of liberalism in Europe.

The reader is left, however, with one unanswered problem. Why the greatness of Marx? How did it come about that the "legend" of Marx waxed and grew in the years following his death? Perhaps this is explained by the "follower-commanding" quality of certain of the Marxian slogans—certainly it is partially accounted for by the popularization of the Marxian thesis in the *Communist Manifesto* — but did these slogans and this pamphlet represent Marx and Engels true opinions? Another book might well be written on the Twentieth century development of the myth of Marx, and this reviewer for one would like to see Schwarzschild tackle the job.

In the meantime the *Red Prussian* qualifies as the outstanding interpretative biography of Marx which has yet appeared. Writ-

ten in an easy style, which has lost nothing by its translation from the German, the book opens new vistas for the student of Marx and Marxism and does so at a time when their spiritual descendants in truth "shake the world."

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

E. Adams Davis: *Of The Night Wind's Telling; Legends From The Valley of Mexico*, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1946, pp. xxiv, 276, \$3.00.)

This book contains an introduction, 27 legends, and an appendix on methods and materials.

The locale of the legends is confined to the Valley of Mexico, and of more than half to Mexico City, the fabled Tenochtitlán. All except one of the legends are of ancient origin and, with another exception—*The Patient Lady* of the Maximilian period—, date back to Spanish colonial or to Toltec and Aztec times prior to the coming of the *Conquistador*. The church and the supernatural vie with romantic love and its accoutrements as the chief subjects of the legends. In two, the wisdom of the viceroys recalls the tales about Solomon. The only one of comparatively recent times concerns Zapata, hero to the peons. In this tale the lack of the simplicity and directness of the older legends is perhaps due to its recency, to the fact that many years are required for the artful synthesis of the telling.

The author described the methods employed. For the preceding year and several summers he had been on an avid search for the legends. With only a few exceptions he heard all the legends orally, and took detailed notes during the telling or soon afterwards. The complete story was reduced to written narrative as soon as possible. Then began the process of checking the author's version based on oral accounts against the written versions, the chief sources for the latter being the recording of old chroniclers and foreign travellers, the histories, and guidebooks, ancient and modern. The author achieves synthesis from oral accounts and historical research, from a thorough knowledge and the application of his own lively imagination.

In the first place, the book is good entertainment. In addition the legends reflect the thought, traditions, and the emotional life of the folk and the fusion of aboriginal and Spanish cultures. Of particular interest in several of the legends is the insight of the process of religious syncretism.

University of Arkansas

J. L. Charlton

Pearce and Thomason: *Southwesterners Write*. (An Anthology Selected and Edited by T. M. Pearce and A. P. Thomason, The University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1946, pp. 364, \$4.00.)

Those who love books for their content are more often those with the least money with which to buy them; but, rich man or poor man, casual reader or scholar will get a full four-dollars-worth out of the volume *Southwesterners Write*. And any reader with the Southwest in his blood will not be content to return this anthology to somebody else's library shelf; he'll want it close at hand for pleasure or reference or study as the mood directs.

Southwesterners Write presents thirty-two stories and articles on the American Southwest with interpretation, fiction, narrative, and opinion the four main divisions of content. By selecting "guide lines" from representative contributions in each of the four divisions, this reviewer chooses to tempt rather than interpret—thus preserving the fullest possible measure of enjoyment for the reader.

Interpretation:

A Note on Texas by Charles J. Finger: "This is a note about Texas . . . Texas when business was conducted in great measure before the bar, with one foot on the brass rail and the barkeeper present by way of witness or arbiter or court of appeal, diagrams and helpful calculations being drawn on the counter with spilled beer . . ."

New Mexico by D. H. Lawrence: "Those who have spent morning after morning there pitched among the pines above the great proud world of desert will know, almost unbearably how beautiful it is, how clear and unquestioned is the might of day."

Horns by J. Frank Dobie: "Those mighty horns seemed, like the hoarse howl of the lobo, the wide wheeling of the eagle, and the great silence on the grass, to be a natural part of the freedom, the wildness and the self-sufficiency of life belonging to the unfenced world."

The Humor of the Cowboy by Edward Everett Dale: "In the region where he lived along the Pecos the soil was so rich that it was impossible to raise watermelons. The vines grew so fast that they dragged the little melons along over the ground and just naturally wore them out."

Fiction:

Captain Choate by George Milburn: "Captain A. J. Choate had come to Oklahoma in the early days. . . . Some of the boys in the De Luxe Barber shop got to figuring up one day, and they calculated that Captain Choate would have been one hundred and forty-six years old if he had done all the things he had claimed he had done."

You're in Trouble Either Way by Oliver La Farge: "Communist. Dat ain't a religion, it's a—a Russian idea to—to kinda turn everything upside down. . . ."

May the Dew Be Heavy by George Sessions Perry: "He was going to sell the horn so that Tater, his hound, might run in the meet . . .

"I ain't never had no chancet, Tater. Jest the ign'runt son of an ingn'runt tenant farmer. . . . Nur have I got any kids I might one day be proud of. Jest you. An' I know like I know I'm settin' here, you're a champion."

Narrative:

Pastores del Palo Duro by J. Evetts Haley: "Sometimes peculiar circumstance places high prejudice on the wane, and the hot blood cools until even the strongest representatives of a particular culture are traitors to its fundamental laws. This happened when the first sheep and the first cattle came to the Staked Plains of the Southwest."

Opinion:

Taos by John H. McGinnis: "Whether they belong to the conventional or the modern school, all the Taos artists paint Taos Mountain; paint the mountain so industriously it seems destined to become as familiar in America as the Prudential Company has made the Rock of Gibraltar."

Culture by Henry Nash Smith: "More important than the speed with which Texas culture advances is the direction it takes. The energy is here, and there will be more of it in the future. What seems necessary now is that the directors of this energy shall be protected against superficial support from their followers and audiences."

The Myth of Frontier Individualism by Mody C. Boatright: "The absence of a strong labor movement on the frontier is not to be attributed to individualism."

The Southwest in Fiction by Rebecca W. Smith: "The historians and biographers are temporarily involved in the chaos of social change. Folklore awaits more writers like Mary Austin and Frank Dobie and John Lomax to harvest its riches. At the moment it is the novelists who are currently expressing the dynamic life of the Southwestern area most fully and honestly."

Pearce and Thomason in selecting and editing *Southwesterners Write* have presented proof positive that Southwesterners write with all the vigor and color characteristic of their region—an area of shocking geographical contrast and a strange overlapping of cultures. In handling this book with more pleasure than critical analysis, we feel only a single regret: That "Tony" Thomason himself

did not live to know the thrill of its printed completion. To him the anthology is fittingly dedicated.

Austin, Texas

Elithe H. Kirkland

Clarence A. Manning: *The Story of the Ukraine*. (New York; Philosophical Library. 1947, pp. 326, \$3.75.)

Are the forty million Slavs who inhabit the fertile plains of south Russia between the Carpathians and the Don to be regarded as a distinct and separate nationality or merely as one branch of the Russian people? Are they more properly referred to as "Ukrainians" or as "Little Russians"? Can they justly pretend to independence, or should they claim only a measure of decentralization within the Russian empire? No question confronting students of European history is more perplexing, and few are more serious, for upon the answer depends the future of an ethnic group as large as the French and endowed with greater vitality, and upon it, likewise, depends the integrity of the Russian state as constituted by the Empress Catherine in the closing years of the eighteenth century and preserved without major change to the present.

For the author of this book, the answer is simple. He regards the Ukrainians as a separate nation and believes they should be independent. The Great Russians—or "Muscovites" as their enemies call them—are as low in his favor as the Little Russians are high, and in depicting the latter as the true heirs of the original Russia, he goes to the absurd length of playing down the connection between Upper Volga and Kievan Russia, ignoring the large-scale migration of population from the perishing southwest to the forest refuge of the northeast. Once the early period is passed, however, the author preserves a better balance and does not permit his bias to run away with him. The salient features of Ukrainian history—conquest by Asia, redemption by Lithuania, and oppression by Poland—are emphasized, and the story of how the Ukrainians lost their aristocracy and intelligentsia and became a peasant people is duly recorded. The treatment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the period of the national awakening—is, on the whole, satisfactory. Inasmuch as the author is a professor of East European languages, he is particularly qualified to pass on the literary aspects of the nationalist movement. But his account of the modern period suffers from a serious defect—the Jewish question is studiously avoided. There is no mention of the savage outbreaks against Jewry, nor any explanation of why the outbreaks should have been so savage. It is easy to understand why an author interested in reaching as large a public as possible should observe the

taboos of the contemporary American scene, but history is not written in deference to taboos.

While a more adequate knowledge of historical detail would have strengthened the narrative, the fact that it is intended only as a cursory survey and not as an exhaustive study permits the author to achieve a certain success. There is need for a simple, well-written account which follows only the trunk-line of developments without venturing into the by-ways: what is elementary to the specialist can be of profit to the general reader. Even the mild bias of Mr. Manning's account may be excused on the ground that the Ukrainian people are entitled to a few special pleaders in a country so glutted with partisans of the Soviet and of Poland.

The last chapters of the book contain a bitter attack against Soviet policy in the Ukraine—an attack fully justified by the objective circumstances. It is well for the American public to be reminded that the yoke of Kaganovich is every bit as devastating as that of Hitler, and that for almost twenty years the condition of the Ukrainian people has been one of unending agony. Yet one can agree with every word of the author's indictment and still reject his conclusion. His stand for an independent Ukraine is taken in defiance of the elemental facts of economy and population. He ignores the problem of disengaging the Ukrainian economy from that of the rest of the Soviet Union, though he is well aware that for years the whole policy of the Soviet Government has been addressed to making such a disengagement impossible. He ignores the interpenetration of Great and Little Russians in the eastern Ukraine and the character of the population in New Russia, which were complicating factors long before the Soviets came on the scene and scrambled the population still further. The borders of an independent Ukraine could not possibly be delimited without taking in large blocs of Great Russians, and these would be eliminated only by a resort to the same bestial uprooting of populations which the author so justly condemns in the case of the Soviet.

Yet the cry for Ukrainian independence is likely to be heard with increasing frequency in the United States. It will fall on fertile soil, for it would merely apply to Russia the same principle of dismemberment which already has been tried against Germany. It matters not that the principle is stupid and the results disastrous. Propaganda obscures from the common man the obvious fact that it is not so much the subjugation of small states as the dismemberment of large ones which is so deeply unsettling and so destructive of the real foundations of peace.

Milton R. Konvitz: *The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law*. (New York, Cornell University Press, 1946, pp. 299, \$3.00.)

Milton R. Konvitz of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations of Cornell University has given us a legalistic study on the *status* of Aliens in contemporary American Law. Dividing his study into a consideration of the right of the government to exclude and expel Aliens, the privilege of becoming and remaining a citizen, the rights of Aliens to own land, to work, and to share in the natural resources and the educational system, and concluding with an analysis of the position of Americans of Japanese Ancestry in the United States during World War II, the author thoroughly covers the field of Alien activity in our country.

The work, on the whole, is critical of the existing alien laws and appeals for a modernization and humanization of the Alien's legal status in this country. In some instances, as in the author's criticism of the inherent right of the sovereign to exclude and deport Aliens, his program is carried to extremes but in general his recommendations for reform will appeal to all persons of liberal views. The analysis of the Japanese problem is especially detailed and valuable as is also the attempt to connect the protection of the Alien with the maintenance of the assumptions underlying the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. In this respect the author is inclined to view the problem of the Alien as but one aspect of the general defense of Civil Liberties in the United States.

Teachers and students will find this book of special value if for no other reason than that it summarizes both the legal background and the contemporary laws in regard to Aliens in a convenient and up to date form.

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

Paul W. Tappan: *Delinquent Girls in Court, a study of the wayward minor court of New York*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. 265, \$3.00.)

The Wayward Minor Court of New York has been set up by legislation which recognizes that the delinquent girl is a special problem from the legal point of view, as well as from the sociological and psychological point of view. The law is exceptionally flexible in defining procedure and grounds for adjudication. The court in its actual operation has fully utilized all the flexibility provided by the law, perhaps going beyond the anticipations of the lawmakers. A girl who is put in the position of being possibly designated as delinquent (not necessarily in the sexual sense) is exposed to the treatment not only of the court, but also of social, psychological, and med-

ical personnel connected with the court, as well as other persons, agencies, and societies which may or may not have an official connection with the court. Many of these agencies accept and reject cases with reference to their own aims and criteria (e. g. religious, racial, moral), but they are used by the court in disposition of cases.

Tappan, after prolonged observation of the court and the girls who come in contact with it, is able to give a convincing and clear picture of what happens. But the clarity is confined to Tappan's presentation, since the situation he pictures is a confused one. There is confusion in the conceptions of delinquency held by the judges, the parents, the social workers, and the religious and social agencies that have a hand in many of the cases. There is confusion of a comparable degree concerning legal procedure, aims in dealing with the girls, penalties, and methods of correction. The court and its assisting agencies are understaffed. Finally, the fanfare that has accompanied the initiation and operation of the numerous official and unofficial agencies in this field has convinced the public as well as the executive and legislative parts of the government that the whole problem is taken care of.

Flexibility and irregularity have been introduced into the legal procedure with the belief that the court, its agents, and other agencies of unofficial connection can deal with the girl therapeutically, and for her benefit, before adjudication attaches to her the stigma "wayward minor." However, the methods of these treatments are enough similar to the treatment of those actually adjudicated that the stigma occurs even without the adjudication, and the therapeutic and rehabilitative treatment is in many cases not distinguishable from the penalties following adjudication. Kind intentions result in actual as well as legal injustice, and in the contamination of many who would be found innocent by a more careful legal procedure.

The reader will discover that it is not Tappan's aim to find fault. Rather it is to further the basic aims of the whole process by pointing out and eradicating impediments. He makes suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the present set up, and also defines goals to be aimed at in the legislative, judicial, social, and psychological handling of the problem in the future.

University of Florida.

Henry Wunderlich

John F. Cuber: *Sociology*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1947, pp. xiv, 590, \$4.00.)

Here is a valuable contribution to the long shelf of textbooks in sociology. Author Cuber has produced a stimulating volume, with

an original point of view, in which the subject is presented simply, clearly, and comprehensively. Unlike most textbooks, this is one the professional sociologist will wish to place in the hands of the layman who wants to know "Just what is sociology?"

Proceeding from culture as the central fact (The basic discovery of social science, . . . is . . . culture," p. 48.), the book gradually unfolds a presentation of what sociologists have learned about culture, its interactional relations with the individual and its objective manifestations. The headings of the six parts of the book give a good idea of the content: Orientation to Sociology; Background Understanding from Cultural Anthropology; Background Understandings from Social Psychology; Some Groups and Aggregations in Modern Society; Major American Social Institutions; Social Organization, Social Change, and Social Problems. The "processes," presented in Part VI, are assigned a much smaller role by Cuber than by most other textbook writers. Each chapter is briefly summarized and followed by a short, pertinent bibliography and a list of study questions.

Cuber's frequent reminders to students that they view all cultures, including their own, objectively, are, in the reviewer's opinion, among the excellent features of the book. Certainly it is most difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to learn much sociology before he has learned that all cultural values are relative. Since most students approach sociology unaware of this fact, it becomes the teacher's duty to impart it. The criticism, sometimes heard, that knowledge of other cultures weakens the individual's faith in his own, could be valid only if the individual's culture were truly inferior. And then surely he would wish to improve upon it.

Like all sociologists, Cuber owes much to W. G. Sumner's *Folkways*. The reader is surprised, therefore, to see no mention either of Sumner or of his book, though the latter is one of the few great classics of American sociology. Admittedly not all sources can be included in a text of limited dimensions, but to leave out Sumner even from so short a list as Cuber's seems an inexcusable oversight.

The University of Texas

Carl M. Rosenquist

Other Books Received

- Glos, R. E., and Baker, H. A.; *Introduction to Business*. (New York, Southwestern Publishing Co., 1947, pp. 729. \$4.25.)
- Gregory Charles Oscar: *Labor and the Law*. (New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1947, pp. 467. \$5.00)
- Hackett, C. W., ed.: *Pichardo, Limits of Louisiana and Texas*, Vol. IV. (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1947, pp. 514. \$6.50)
- Johnson, C. O.: *Government in the United States*. (New York, Thomas Crowell, 1947, 4th ed, pp. 976. \$3.75)
- Moore, G. A., trans.: *Jean Bodin's Response to Malestroit's Paradoxes*. (Maryland, County Dollar Press, 1947, pp. 86. \$2.75)
- O'Neal, James, and Werner, G. W.: *American Communism*. (New York, E. P. Dutton Co., 1947, pp. 414. \$5.00)
- Peatman, John G.: *Descriptive and Sampling Statistics*. (New York, Harper Brothers, 1947, pp. 577. \$4.50)
- Roucek, J. S., ed.: *Government and Politics Abroad*. (New York, Funk and Wagnalls Co., pp. 585. \$4.00)
- War Production Board: *Dollar a Year and Without Compensation Personnel Policies of the W.P.B.* (Washington, Study No. 27, W.P.B., 1947, pp. 115 and Appendix)
- War Production Board: *Shipbuilding Policies of the W.P.B.* (Washington, Study No. 26, W.P.B., 1947, pp. 207)

News Notes

The Department of Sociology at the University of Kansas, in collaboration with Harvard University, Colgate University, and Ohio University, is making a series of studies in human relations. This department is also making studies in community organization and citizenship.

Professor M. M. McCluggage, Department of Sociology, University of Kansas, will be on sabbatical leave at Harvard University during the fall semester of 1947. He will hold the position of Associate Professor in Human Relations.

Professor Robert G. Foster, of the Merrill-Palmer School, Detroit, Michigan, will be visiting professor at the University of Kansas during the academic year of 1947-48. He will offer courses in Marriage and Family Relationships, and Sociology of the Family.

Two new faculty members have joined the Department of Business Administration and Economics at New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts. They are W. A. Alford, Assistant Professor, formerly with Morehead State Teachers College, Morehead, Kentucky, and Dr. James I. Culbert, formerly with State Teachers College, Tempe, Arizona.

John W. White, formerly Superintendent of the Rice Branch Experiment Station, has assumed his duties as Head of the Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas. He succeeds T. R. Hedges, who has accepted a position in Agricultural Economics, at the University of California.

Harold G. Scoggins has assumed his duties as Instructor in the Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas.

Noel H. Wood has been appointed Assistant Professor in the Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas.

V. B. Fielder, Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas, attended the meeting of the American Institute of Cooperation, Ft. Collins, Colorado in August.

Franz Adler, Jr. has accepted the position of Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Arkansas.

Steven Stephen, formerly Chairman of the Social Science Department, Stout Institute, has been appointed Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Arkansas.

Three new faculty members have joined the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology at Texas A. & M. College. They are Dr. John G. McNeely, Associate Professor Agricultural Economics, Mr. Marion N. Williamson, Jr., Economist in Farm Management, and Mr. Kenneth A. Fugett, Research Marketing Specialist.

Dr. John Rydjord, head of the History Department, is now directing the graduate work at the University of Wichita.

Estal E. Sparlin has returned as Assistant Director to the St. Louis Governmental Research Institute, after spending two years on leave assisting the Missouri General Assembly with statutory revision under the 1945 Missouri State Constitution.

Maurice J. Erickson, formerly an economist with the Bureau of Labor Statistics and earlier on the faculty at Texas Technological College, has accepted a position as Associate Professor of Economics at Southwest Texas State College, replacing Karl E. Ashburn who has been appointed Professor of Economics at Texas A. and M. College.

William R. Rairigh, Instructor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Government at Southwest Texas State College.

Cecil O. Hahn, formerly of the staff of the Historical Section of the Air University at Maxwell Field, Alabama, is now a Professor of History at Southwest Texas State College.

Madge Maier, formerly Instructor of History at Southwest Texas State College, has accepted a position with the Foreign Service branch of the State Department.

Joseph P. Montgomery, Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at Louisiana State University, attended a school and conference of statisticians at Blacksburg, Virginia. Jerry M. Law and Kenneth E. Ford, research assistants in the Department of Agricultural Economics also attended the conference.

Three new staff members have joined the Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky. They are, Professor William E. Newbolt, formerly of Berea College, Mr. Harry M. Palmer, and Mr. Charles A. Acton.

Miss Alva Marion Matherly, formerly of the staff of the Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky, is now attending the Law College at the University of Kentucky.

Mr. E. K. Turner, formerly of the University of Kentucky Bureau of Business Research, has accepted a position with the Kentucky State Department of Revenue. He will remain at the University working on an assessor's manual under the direction of James W. Martin of the Bureau of Business Research.

Several new faculty members have joined the Department of Psychology, University of Kansas. They are Professors Roger G. Barker, and Fritz Heider; Associate Professor Herbert Wright, and Assistant Professor Grace M. Heider. Harriette Galantieri, Milton Horowitz, Margaret Riggs, and James E. Simpson are newly appointed instructors in the department.